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Mystiset kokemukset ovat hyvin erityislaatuisia kokemuksia, jotka kuvausten ja 
määritelmien perusteella näyttäisivät ylittävän normaalin käsityskykymme rajat aina sen 
perustavimpia rakenteita myöten. Kautta aikojen, mystikot lähtöisin lukuisista eri 
perinteistä ja jopa täysin perinteiden ulkopuolelta ovat kertoneet kohdanneensa 
toisenlaisen todellisuuden, joka sen julkilausumattomuudesta huolimatta on näyttäytynyt 
paljon todellisempana kuin tavallinen todellisuus.  
  
Tarkastelen tutkielmassani mystisismin ja mystisten kokemusten merkityksellisyyttä, 
arvoa ja validiteettia. Mystisten kokemusten luonne ja määritelmä rajaavat samalla 
yleisemmin mystisismin luonnetta ja filosofisen mystisismin keskiössä onkin jo yli 
vuosisadan ollut kysymys mystisten kokemusten luonteesta. Ovatko mystiset kokemukset 
oma, erityislaatuinen kokemusten luokkansa, vai kuuluvatko ne perustaltaan tavallisten 
kokemusten luokkaan? Tämä kysymys on myös tutkielmani keskiössä. Esitän oman 
vastaukseni kysymykseen, mikä mahdollistaa pyrkimykseni mystisismin 
merkityksellisyyden ja arvon jatkotarkasteluun. 
 
Mystisten kokemusten julkilausumattomuuden ongelma ei hälvene vastauksestani 
huolimatta, vaan se kulkee oleellisena osana läpi koko tutkielman. Määrittelen sen avulla 
niitä rajoja, joiden puitteissa tarkastelen mystisismin ja mystisten kokemusten 
merkityksellisyyttä ja arvoa eri konteksteissa.  
 
Mystikoiden kokema ja kuvaama mystinen todellisuus pitää sisällään yksinkertaisesti 
kaiken mahdollisen. Ulkopuolinen fyysinen maailma ja kokija itse kietoutuvat mystisesti 
tähän julkilausumattomaan korkeimpaan Todellisuuteen. Tarkastelen mystisen 
Todellisuuden ja tavallisen todellisuuden erojen, ja mystiseltä kannalta myös 
välttämättömän yhteneväisyyden merkitystä, sekä niitä tapoja joilla voimme näitä hyvin 
erilaisia todellisuuksia ylipäätään lähestyä.  
 
Yhdistävänä teemana läpi koko tutkielman on pyrkimykseni osoittaa että mystisismi ja 
mystiset kokemukset ovat merkityksellisiä ja valideja tapoja yrittää ymmärtää 
todellisuuden luonnetta. Pyrin osoittamaan että mystisismin merkitys ei rajoitu vain 
akateemisen mystisismin ja uskonnon filosofian piiriin, vaan mystisismi on, kuten se on 
ollut kautta aikojen, merkityksellinen tapa ymmärtää ja lähestyä todellisuuden 
perimmäisintä olemusta.   
 
Asiasanat: mysticism, mystical experience, perennialism, constructivism  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Throughout the ages humans have attempted to understand the nature of reality and the 
meaning of our own fleeting existence. Contemporary scholarly mysticism is 
continuation; an addendum to a millennia of curious minds seeking answers to “eternal 
questions”. It deals with everything from absolute emptiness of experiences free from all 
conceptual constraints, all the way to the fullness of the Reality incorporating absolutely 
everything; every possible thing.  
The task of scholarly mysticism is to try to limit the limitless, to comprehend the 
incomprehensible. The boundaries and limitations of scholarly mysticism are the limits 
of our capability to understand the experiences of mystics who have been able to 
transcend the very same limitations. I believe that the main task of mysticism is not the 
exploration of these boundaries but to seek ways and approaches to expand them and 
thereby take us towards an ever better understanding of the mystical reality that is hiding 
behind these limitations. It is the task of mysticism to bring down all possible barriers and 
see the Truth of mystics as clearly as possible.  
There is no doubt in my mind that the mere possibility of the existence of the Truth that 
is within the reach of a mystical vision, that is, a form of perception human beings have 
the capacity for, is indeed the only satisfying goal for a quest for the fundamental answers 
for—to put it mildly—everything. But this quest, as we shall see, is—to again put it 
mildly—inconceivable. Like we can read from the anonymous author of Theologia 
Germanica: 
 
The things which are in part can be apprehended, known, and expressed; but 
the Perfect cannot be apprehended, known, or expressed by any creature as 
creature. Therefore we do not give a name to the Perfect, for it is none of 
these. The creature as creature cannot know nor apprehend it, name nor 
conceive it (T. I, p.2.). 1 
 
                                                          
1 Kingsland 1927: 8 
2 
 
The above quote illustrates the difficult task that every study of mysticism must address. 
The key object motivating this study is my desire to make some progress, however 
limited, in comprehending mysticism as a phenomenon or a concept, which by definition 
lies beyond ordinary comprehension. 
 
1.1. Defining Mysticism 
 
                                          Mysticism is the art of union with Real 
                                          -Evelyn Underhill, Practical Mysticism 
 
In general, the usage of the term ‘mysticism’ has a great variety of meanings. Anything 
that is somehow ‘weird,’ ‘otherworldly,’ or ‘spiritual’ is often and mistakenly labeled as 
being mystical and thus inferred to belong to mysticism. However, mysticism can also be 
any of those things depending on how one relates to different aspects of what mysticism 
can contain. Mysticism deals with the fundamental aspects of reality and states of 
consciousness far removed from what is generally understood to be “normal”. In other 
words, mysticism explores the mystical side of reality. William Kingsland writes: 
 
Mysticism is essentially the exercise of a supernormal faculty transcending 
intellect, whereby the individual obtains a vital and conscious experience in 
his inmost being of his oneness with what has been variously termed the 
Absolute, or Reality, or the Intelligible world, or the Infinite, or God a sense 
of union with the transcendent yet immanent Root and Source of all Being 
and all Becoming.2   
 
Kingsland is describing mystical experiences and a vast majority of studies on mysticism 
seem to agree with their central role. I strongly agree with this and in my opinion any 
philosophical inquiry into mysticism must take a stance regarding the nature of mystical 
experiences. As we shall see in the third chapter, the way one conceives the nature of 
mystical experiences directs any further inquiries into greatly differing directions. 
                                                          
2 Kinsgland 1927: vi-vii 
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Mysticism can be a study of Absolutes; highest possible manifestations of Reality or it 
can be reduced to a mere subchapter in the study of atypical states of consciousness.  
Accepting any validity to mystical experiences as a non-ordinary state of consciousness 
with an actual object is often limited to mysticism stemming from specific traditions that 
already acknowledge such an object. For example, Christian mysticism has no trouble 
examining the object of mystical experiences as God of the Scripture whereas Gnostic 
mysticism can assume the experienced object to be Heavenly Pleroma. These kind of 
mystical paradigms offer guidelines on how to approach mysticism and mystical 
experiences. Alfred Sharpe presents an illustrative example of Christian mysticism: 
 
Mysticism is the final step, in one direction, of the differentiating process. As 
God, the personal and transcendent Creator, is the ultimate term of 
metaphysics, so the mystical or immediate knowledge of God is the ultimate 
of that relation of the human soul to Him, as its source, object and end, which 
constitutes religion.3 
 
However, in this study I will not approach the topic from any particular religious, 
spiritual, or theological position. Mysticism and mystical experiences deal with a type of 
a reality consisting of concepts that are far removed from what we are accustomed to. I 
therefore believe that it is more appropriate to approach the subject without forcing it into 
any of the various, existing conceptual schemes whose validity I would have to either 
validate or assume. Instead, I believe in the value of maintaining an open-minded 
approach without an intellectual commitment to any strict definition of mysticism, 
acknowledging not just the difficulties but also the opportunities that such an approach 
entails. The scope of the subject matter for open inquiry into mysticism is well described 
by Edward Watkin who called mysticism as philosophy of the Unlimited.    
 
Historically the most satisfactory metaphysic has employed mystical data. I 
have therefore endeavoured in this book to state the metaphysic implicit in 
mystical experience, a philosophy of mysticism. This philosophy is the body 
of truth about the nature of ultimate reality and of our relationship to it to be 
derived from the content of mystical experience.4 
                                                          
3 Sharpe 1910: xxviii 
4 Watkin 1920: 11 
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What Watkin seems to be saying is that mysticism is better understood as a study of the 
fundamental aspects of reality that are revealed to the mystic in the form of a mystical 
experience where s/he encounters the mystical object. I strongly agree with Watkins 
emphasis on this side of Mysticism. However, It is clear that mysticism takes its shape 
and form from mystical experiences and their nature should be established at least to some 
degree before examining the mystical object that the mystics encounter. 
Before proceeding, I feel it is necessary to make few remarks regarding the connection of 
mysticism and mystical experiences with religious experiences. Especially in religious 
studies mystical and religious experiences are often equated and mystical experiences are 
seen as “intense” or “high” form of religious experience. This is not necessarily wrong, 
but I feel that the gap between the two types of experiences is so vast that equating them 
can be quite misleading. Here, I will be emphasizing the unique nature of mystical 
experiences, highlighting that they contain characteristics that no other experience 
possess. I feel that mysticism should be treated as a unique phenomenon and any labels 
and characterizations should be given to it only after careful consideration; something I 
am aiming to accomplish in this study. 
In the end, mysticism in an extremely complex and multifaceted topic. Its subject matter 
goes beyond the realm of ordinary and the scholar of mysticism must try to understand 
something that by definition can never be fully understood. But I feel that this is also the 
beauty of mysticism and its study; whereof one cannot speak, thereof scholar of 
mysticism cannot remain silent. 
 
1.2. Purpose of This Study 
 
Regardless of the difficulties encountered in and around mysticism, it is my purpose to 
attempt to study the validity and the value of mystical experiences. The validity of 
mysticism is directly proportional to the validity of mystical experiences. In chapter two, 
I will present some common definitions and categories for mystical experiences. As we 
shall see, there have been various ways to define them. The main purpose of this chapter 
is not to declare what mystical experiences actually are, but to illuminate the type of 
experiences mysticism deals with and to set the stage for the third chapter where I will 
introduce and take part in a century old debate between perennialism and constructivism 
5 
 
regarding the nature of mystical experiences. This debate and the position one takes in it 
is a great turning point in any study of mysticism; the choice one makes dictates where 
one can proceed and which questions become meaningful. This chapter also acts as my 
central argument regarding the validity of mysticism and mystical experiences. 
Chapter four is a direct consequence of my own position in the debate that allows me to 
approach the object of mystical experiences. I feel that the mere ability to explore the 
object of mystical experience shows not just the scope, but also the value of mysticism. 
With what I see as a very well justified premise, it is possible to ask some eternal questions 
and even gain glimpses and vague outlines of answers. 
In chapter five, I will compare mysticism with science. Natural sciences share a similar 
goal to mysticism in that they are both attempts to better understand this reality we exist 
in. I will compare the ways in which this understanding is gained in an attempt to show 
that even if science can be seen as anti-mystical, it does not manage to invalidate the type 
of understanding and knowledge that mysticism and mystical experiences provide. I will 
also examine some approaches that cognitive sciences have taken to understand mystical 
experiences and how cognitive science has both tried to validate and invalidate mysticism 
and mystical experiences.  
Chapter six will present some topics where I believe that mysticism can offer valuable 
framework and perspectives. I feel that this aspect of mysticism has been generally 
undervalued and underrepresented by scholarly mysticism. 
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2. TYPES OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES 
 
 
There are a great number of different classifications for mystical experiences. It seems 
that many, if not most, authors of mysticism like to come up with their own definitions 
and classifications. I believe that this is mainly done for two reasons. Firstly, it is done in 
order to make the various aspects of mysticism, which most commonly relate to the 
epistemological ramifications of mystical experience, to fit in with their academic, 
spiritual, religious or any such purposes and tasks they aim to accomplish. Secondly, 
many authors of mysticism have a strong religious background.5 They classify the various 
concepts that can be found in mysticism in a way that is in accordance with their 
conceptual commitments acquired from their respective religious backgrounds. Buddhist 
mystic or scholar of mysticism, for example, does not call the object of mystical 
experience a ‘God.’ Similarly a mystic or scholar coming from a theistic Abrahamic 
tradition generally does not classify mystical experiences as pantheistic. However, I 
believe that we can see the immense power of mystical experiences in instances when 
mystics are capable of overcoming their religio-cultural background frameworks. This is 
the case for example with one of the most famous Christian mystics, Meister Eckhart 
(1260-1328), whose mysticism is strongly pantheistic, at least partly resulting in some of 
his writings to be condemned by the Church. Another Example with more sinister ending 
comes from Sufism. Famous Sufi mystic al-Hallaj (858-922) was gruesomely executed 
because of him openly speaking about mystical experiences6. It should be kept in mind 
that some, myself included, consider mystical experiences to be the culmination of unique 
type of religious and/or spiritual life; mystics and mystical experiences do not necessarily 
possess such value within religious traditions. 
Comprehensively defining mystical experience is certainly no easy task as most of what 
it represents and entails is in direct and clear contradiction to normal way of human 
perception and understanding. Mystical experience does not just defy, and maybe even 
deny, our everyday understanding of the nature of our own selves and the world 
                                                          
5 There are many “sub-fields” of mysticism such as Christian mysticism, Buddhist mysticism, Islamic 
mysticism and pretty much any tradition that incorporates any form of contact with Gods or Realities 
above or beyond our own can have mysticism focused only on their respective tradition and its teaching. 
6 Smart 1998: 281, 298 
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surrounding us. They can also, as we shall see, defy the very core of logical systems 
thought to be impenetrable and immutable by any intrusions. 
I will next present some scholars’ attempts to define mysticism and mystical experiences. 
It should be kept in mind that mysticism cannot be completely separate from mystical 
experiences and to some degree defining one also defines the other. 
 
2.1. William James’ Mysticism 
 
The most famous and regularly cited view on mystical experiences comes from William 
James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience in which he lists four characteristics that 
according to him are required for the experience to be called ‘mystical’.7 First two and 
most important characteristics (“marks”) are ineffability and noetic quality. 
Ineffability and especially the problems it brings to dealing with mysticism and mystical 
experiences is something that is regularly encountered and basically every study dealing 
with mystical experiences has to somehow deal with it or justify its absence. James’ 
describes ineffable experience: 
 
The Subject of it immediately say that it defies expression, that no adequate 
report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality 
must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. 
In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states 
of intellect.8 
 
It is clear how this characteristic can and will be a hindrance in trying to understand 
mystical experiences. In direct contrast to ineffability is the noetic quality of mystical 
experiences: 
 
                                                          
7 James 2002: 294-295. James does note that the four marks justify experience to be called mystical in 
regards to his lectures on The Varieties of Religious Experience. However, his classification has lived on 
outside of his own lectures and scholars of mysticism quite often refer to them. But as we shall see, not 
all are in agreement with him.  
8 James 2002: 295 
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Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who 
experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into 
depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, 
revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they 
remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for 
after-time.9 
 
For James these first two characteristics are most important and by themselves “entitle 
any state to be called mystical.”10 Mystical experiences are ‘knowledge-giving’ and at the 
same time they are ineffable and our concepts are not capable of adequately describing 
the experience from which the noetic quality supposedly has also risen. The inclusion of 
these two characteristics has led to a long-lasting debate about the nature of mystical 
experiences and the knowledge they purportedly contain. We will be facing this problem 
in full force later as it will become the center of our attention in the third and fourth 
chapter. 
The remaining two characteristics are transiency and passivity, which are rarely even 
listed in contemporary literature and in the same spirit brief mention of them should 
suffice. Transiency means that mystical experiences do not last long and passivity refers 
to the passive character of the experience once it has begun; mystic is not active during 
the experience but a passive witness to it.11 However, it should be noted that these ‘lesser’ 
characteristics do appear in scholarly mysticism as part of much more elaborate and wider 
concepts. For example, transiency can be contrasted with the long lasting psychological 
transformation of the mystic even from just one mystical experience. Passivity or the lack 
of it, on the other hand is generally assumed and is one of the main topics in the debate 
regarding the nature of mystical experiences that will later become our focus. 
 
2.2. Nature-mysticism, Soul-mysticism and God-mysticism 
 
Frederick C. Happold agrees with the James’ four characteristics but he adds three 
additional characteristics of his own. Continuing on James’ list:  
                                                          
9 James 2002: 295 
10 James 2002: 295 
11 James 2002: 295  
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(5) Presence of a consciousness of the Oneness of everything 
In mystical experience “All is One and One is All” and “All feelings of duality and 
multiplicity are obliterated, including the duality between man and Deity.”12 I feel that 
this in particular, but also the following additions are extremely important addition to 
James’ list as they do not just give insight into how mystical experiences are ineffable13, 
but also expresses well the immense scope and especially the uniqueness of the subject 
matter of mysticism. 
(6) Sense of timelessness 
Timelessness further separates mystical experiences from ordinary experiences and 
Happold argues that they should not be examined through ordinary notions of past, 
present and future “[f]or the mystic feels himself to be in a dimension where time is not, 
where ‘all is always now’.”14 
(7) Conviction that the familiar phenomenal ego is not the real I 
In the unitive mystical experience the “self” of the mystic is no longer separate from the 
object of the experience but instead becomes something else. It is not the phenomenal ego 
but the “True or Greater Self” that experiences unity with the Absolute, or in other words 
becomes/is the Absolute.15 
Happold elaborates on mystical experiences and mysticism beyond a list of characteristics 
with which to recognize mystical experiences.  For Happold the mystical consciousness 
is: 
 
Particular form of consciousness, out of which arise types of experience, akin 
to, but not to be confused or equated with, those labeled ‘religious’, and which 
results in a special sort of spirituality, giving that word a wide connotation, 
and predisposition to interrogate and interpret the universe in particular way. 
Further, I have regarded it as a tenable hypothesis that this ‘mystical 
consciousness’ is, of its nature, in some way a development and extension of 
rational consciousness, resulting in an enlargement and refining of 
                                                          
12 Happold 1990: 47 
13 Even if we have concepts of ’unity’ and ’union’ it is obvious that if mystical experience includes complete 
dissolution of duality and multiplicity it already becomes something that is something totally other and 
different from ordinary experiences. Such an experience would certainly be impossible to adequately 
express using ordinary concepts at our disposal.  
14 Happold 1990: 48 
15 Happold 1990: 48-50 
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perception, and consequently having a noetic quality, so that through it 
knowledge of the ‘real’ is gained which could not be gained through rational 
consciousness.16 
 
Happold begins by dividing mystical experiences “for convenience” into two types 
“which may be called the mysticism of love and unions and the mysticism of knowledge 
and understanding.” This division is based on the underlying urge the mystic possesses, 
but it is not to be seen as definite division as he points out that “they are in no way 
exclusive, indeed they are always, in some degree, combined”. The urge underlying the 
mysticism of love and union is “to escape from a sense of separation, from the loneliness 
of selfhood, towards a closer participation and reunion with Nature or God, which will 
bring peace and rest to the soul”. The urge underlying the mysticism of knowledge and 
understanding is “to find the secret of the universe, to grasp it not in parts but in its 
wholeness.”17 
Happold continues from the convenient division based on the underlying urge the mystic 
possesses to a division based on the characteristics of the mystical experience by dividing 
mystical experiences into nature-mysticism, soul-mysticism, and God-mysticism. He 
points out that his division is just one possible ‘angle’ to view mystical experiences. I 
could not agree more with this kind of an open and non-restrictive approach. Beyond the 
valuable clarity of his definitions, his divisions capture at least in part what, in my view, 
is essential about mysticism and mystical experiences in particular, but as he himself 
admits, it is just one possible ‘angle’. 
 
2.2.1. Nature-Mysticism 
 
In nature-mysticism the experienced mystical object18 is seen to manifest as the totality 
of Nature. Everything is God and in mystical experience unity is attained with the God, 
with everything. As an example of nature-mysticism Happold uses a poem by English 
poet William Wordsworth (1770-1850): 19 
                                                          
16 Happold 1990: 17 
17 Happold 1990: 40-41 
18 Happold uses the terms God and the One 
19 Happold 1990: 43 
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A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things. 
 
Happold also describes experiences of Richard Jefferies (1848-1987), an English nature 
writer as an example of nature mysticism. According to him, Jeffries was also an atheist, 
which makes his mystical experiences especially interesting since there was no religious 
doctrine or God of any definition to guide his mystical quest20. Jeffries describes his 
experiences in his “The Story of My Heart”: 
 
Then I addressed the sun, desiring the soul equivalent of his light and 
brilliance, his endurance and unwearied race. I turned to the blue heaven over, 
gazing into its depth, inhaling its exquisite colour and sweetness. The rich 
blue of the unattainable flower of the sky drew my soul towards it, and there 
it rested, I for pure colour is rest of heart. By all these I prayed; I felt an 
emotion of the soul beyond all definition; prayer is a puny thing to it, and the 
word is a rude sign to the feeling, but I know no other.21 
 
It is certainly not uncommon phenomenon to feel deep emotions when one is engulfed in 
admiring the natural beauty of our world or stargazing and realizing the depths and scope 
of the space surrounding our planet. In nature-mysticism the nature seems to acts as a sort 
of a meditative object that when truly realized the totality of nature is revealed. 
 
2.2.2. Soul-Mysticism 
 
Soul-mysticism seems to be the opposite of nature-mysticism. There is no God that is 
experienced, nor is there any union with any mystical entity, be it God, Nature or the 
Absolute. God is totally absent in the experience. The soul or the spirit of the mystic is 
itself numinous and in the mystical experience this soul enters into a “complete isolation 
                                                          
20 Happold 1990: 384-385 
21 Jeffries 1883: 4 
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from everything that is other than itself” and “The chief object of man is the quest of his 
own self and of right knowledge about it.”22 
Main idea seems to be that the outside world and our normal ways of experiencing it are 
obstructing the mystic from experiencing the Truth of the Self. The mystic quest is not 
towards the outside world or beyond it, but it is aimed inwards, with the goal of purifying 
all of the obstructions that are denying the true self (i.e., the soul or the spirit) from 
realizing its true and numinous eternal nature. Our normal way of experiencing and 
understanding the world can be seen as a conceptual prison that prevents us from seeing 
the truth lying outside. Just like in Plato’s cave, we only see the shadow play of the Truth. 
Happold considers Meister Eckharts’ mysticism to be a combination of God and soul-
mysticism: “In Eckhart’s teaching, beneath sense perception, beneath the sensuous will, 
beneath the higher power of memory, reason and reasonable will, lies the soul, the apex, 
the spark, the heaven within. It is there that man may find God”.23  
 
2.2.3. God-Mysticism 
 
In God-mysticism, the aspects from both soul-mysticism and nature-mysticism are 
combined. The basic idea here is that the “soul” or the “spirit” of the mystic returns to its 
“Infinite Ground”. In this process both the self and the world are completely obliterated 
to give “room” to the mystical experience as the mystic is able to experience that which 
is God. This kind of obliteration of the self and the world is very common in the eastern 
mystical traditions. In western mystical traditions it is more common to say that the soul 
is ‘deified,’ which means that instead of obliterating the self and the world. Mystic 
becomes God in a process of union without necessarily losing his/her identity but instead 
transforms into something else. As a result a new, mystical identity is achieved.24  
Happold also points out that these types are not to be seen as clear-cut divisions and 
categories isolated from each other. Instead they can, and often do, intermix and co-exist: 
 
                                                          
22 Happold 1990: 44 
23 Happold 1990: 270-271 
24 Happold 1990: 44-45  
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With the exception of pure soul-mysticism, mystical experiences may take 
several analogous forms. They may be (1) pan-en-henic, i.e. the sense of the 
all in an undifferentiated non-dual One and this One in the all; or (2) pan-en-
theistic, i.e. the sense that all is in God and God is in all; or (3) pan-theistic. 
In this latter either Deity or the 'divine' is felt as being 'contained' within 
creation, or that, to quote from the Upanishads, 'there is nothing in the world 
which is not God'.25  
 
In sum, Happold’s definition offers a good ‘angle’ to approach mystical experiences. 
However, as we will see in the next chapter, definitions offer potential to form typologies 
but focusing on them can also be problematic. 
 
2.3. Intovertive and Extrovertive Mystical Experiences 
 
There are alternative ways to distinguish across different types of mystical experiences. 
Walter Terence Stace (1886-1967), among others, makes a straightforward, simple and 
popular division between introvertive and extrovertive mystical experiences: 
 
The essential difference between them is that the extrovertive experience 
looks outward through the senses, while the introvertive looks inward into the 
mind. Both culminate in the perception of an ultimate Unity-what Plotinus 
called the One-with which the perceiver realizes his own union or even 
identity. But the extrovertive mystic, using his physical senses, perceives the 
multiplicity of external material objects- the sea, the sky, the houses, the trees-
mystically transfigured so that the One, or the Unity, shines through them. 
The Introvertive mystic, on the contrary, seeks by deliberately shutting off 
the senses, by obliterating from consciousness the entire multiplicity of 
sensations, images, and thoughts, to plunge into the depths of his own ego. 
There in that darkness and silence, he alleges that he perceives the One-and 
is united with it-not as a Unity seen though the multiplicity (as in extrovertive 
experience), but as the wholly naked One devoid of plurality whatever.26 
 
Division of mystical experiences to introvertive and extrovertive types is a very broad 
one. William Rowe summarizes: “The extrovertive way looks outward through the senses 
                                                          
25 Happold 1990: 43 
26 Stace 1961: 61-62 emphasis added 
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into the world around us and finds the divine reality there. The introvertive way turns 
inward and finds the divine reality in the deepest part of the self.”27 
As we can see from the quote from Stace above, it certainly seems that the division is 
primarily a methodological one at its core, but that it ultimately seems to lead to a similar 
“perception of an ultimate Unity”. However, this kind of view is not often found among 
scholars of mysticism. A further examination reveals that also Stace ends up regarding 
these two types of mystical experiences to be of very different kinds and not just because 
of the initial methodology used in attaining the experience.  
 
2.3.1. Extrovertive Mystical Experience 
 
Stace explores seven different mystical extrovertive experiences and, based on those, he 
provides a list of common characteristics for extrovertive mystical experiences:28 
  
1. The unifying vision, expressed abstractly by the formula "All is One." The One is, in 
extrovertive mysticism, perceived through the physical senses, in or through the 
multiplicity of objects. 
2. The more concrete apprehension of the One as being an inner subjectivity in all things, 
described variously as life, or consciousness, or a living Presence. The discovery that 
nothing is "really" dead. 
3. Sense of objectivity or reality. 
4. Feeling of blessedness, joy, happiness, satisfaction, etc. 
5. Feeling that what is apprehended is holy, or sacred, or divine. This is the quality which 
gives rise to the interpretation of the experience as being an experience of "God." It is the 
specifically religious element in the experience. It is closely intertwined with, but not 
identical with, the previously listed characteristic of blessedness and joy. 
6. Paradoxicality. 
7. Alleged by mystics to be ineffable, incapable of being described in words, etc. 
 
                                                          
27 Rowe 2007: 78 
28 Stace 1961: 79 
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The list seems to describe something very similar to Happold’s nature mysticism and the 
Jeffries’ experience fits well with the list. Stace himself quotes Eckhart as an example of 
extrovertive type of mystical experience: 
  
All that a man has externally in multiplicity is intrinsically One. Here all 
blades of grass, wood, and stone, all things are One. This is the deepest 
depth.29 
 
In the quote Eckhart is speaking about external things, blades of grass, wood and stone. 
This clearly refers to using one’s own physical senses. Eckhart, even if he does not 
specifically point out that he himself is the one having the mystical experience, I trust 
Stace when he points out that: “But no one who is familiar with his style of writing can 
doubt that the "depth" of which he speaks is the depth of his own experience.”30 
Here we can clearly see the inherent difficulties in understanding mysticism and accepting 
mystical experiences as real. How can grass, wood and stone be the same as such state 
clearly violates the core logic that makes us able to understand the world of divisions 
filled with separate entities that surround us. For stone to be lying on the grass we need 
to have assumed and maintained a separation between the stone and the grass, for without 
separation they could not possess such or any relation with each other. It seems that in 
the extrovertive mystical experience distinction and identity co-exist in some peculiar, 
that is, mystical way. Stace quotes Rudolf Otto in this matter:31 
 
Black does not cease to be black, nor white white. But black is white and 
white is black. The opposites coincide without ceasing to be what they are in 
themselves. 
 
It is certainly difficult for someone who has not had an experience of this kind, where 
distinction and identity co-exist, to accept that such an experience is possible. This is a 
                                                          
29 Stace 1961: 63 
30 Stace 1961: 64 
31 Stace 1961: 65 
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clear example of the kind of problem that arises from the ineffable nature of mystical 
experiences. 
 
2.3.2. Introvertive Mystical Experience 
 
Stace also explores different introvertive mystical experiences and provides a list of 
common characteristics for them:32 
 
1. The Unitary Consciousness, from which all the multiplicity of sensuous or conceptual 
or other empirical content has been excluded, so that there remains only a void and empty 
unity. This is the one basic, essential, nuclear characteristic, from which most of the others 
inevitably follow. 
2. Being nonspatial and nontemporal. This of course follows from the nuclear 
characteristic just listed. 
3. Sense of objectivity or reality. 
4. Feelings of blessedness, joy, peace, happiness, etc. 
5. Feeling that what is apprehended is holy, sacred, or divine. 
6. Paradoxicality. 
7. Alleged by mystics to be ineffable 
 
The first listed characteristic gives us another example of the extremely paradoxical 
nature of the subject matter. Since our normal, ordinary consciousness is based on 
concepts, non-conceptual form of consciousness is certainly difficult to accept and indeed 
impossible to imagine for someone who has not had mystical experience of the kind. As 
Stace asks:  
 
Suppose that, after having got rid of all sensations, one should go on to 
exclude from consciousness all sensuous images, and then all abstract 
thoughts, reasoning processes, volitions, and other particular mental contents; 
what would there then be left of consciousness?33 
                                                          
32 Stace 1961: 110-111 
33 Stace 1961: 85-86 
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Stace himself believes he has found the answer from the descriptions of the experiences 
of mystics. Their answer is that it is not a state of unconsciousness as one could assume 
by its defined lack of any mental content. According to mystics, there is something that 
Stace calls “pure” consciousness that still remains after all mental content (as we 
understand it) has been purged from it. This type of “pure” content that remains can be 
understood as a special type of awareness of one’s true self in its most pure form, the 
fundamental essence of oneself. There is not any subject that experiences or object that is 
experienced. Instead, the experience transcends these divisions while still retaining a 
sense of objectivity. When mystic returns from the experience back to normal non-
mystical form of consciousness it is no surprise that lists (7) follows. The experience is 
something that cannot be reached through our normal conceptual scheme.  
To further understand Stace’s version of introvertive mystical experience, he quotes 
Plotinus as an example for introvertive type of mystical experience that describes the loss 
of individuality:34  
 
You ask how can we know the Infinite? I answer, not by reason. It is the office 
of reason to distinguish and define. The Infinite therefore cannot be ranked 
among its objects. You can only apprehend the Infinite . . . by entering into a 
state in which you are your finite self no longer. This is . . . the liberation of 
your mind from finite consciousness. When you thus cease to be finite you 
become one with the Infinite. . . . You realize this union, this identity. 
 
Another example of loss of individuality during introvertive mystical experience Stace 
gives is from theistic tradition by Henry Suso:35 
 
When the spirit by the loss of its self-consciousness has in very truth 
established its abode in this glorious and dazzling obscurity, it is set free from 
every obstacle to union, and from its individual properties . . . when it passes 
away into God. . . . In this merging of itself in God the spirit passes away. 
 
                                                          
34 Stace 1961: 112 Emhpasis by Stace 
35 Stace 1961: 113 
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Richard H. Jones uses a distinction very similar to that of Staces but by his own accord 
he draws a more fundamental distinction between depth-mystical and nature-mystical 
experiences. Depth-mystical experiences are free of all conceptual and sensory content 
and they seem to be closely related to Staces introvertive experiences. The mystic purges 
his mind of all dispositional and cognitive content and, with the conceptual barriers gone, 
the mystic is able to directly experience the Absolute reality. Experiencing the Absolute 
is not seeing it, but becoming it. Similarly to Stace, the depth-mystical state is not 
unconscious state but “Instead this emptiness permits the pouring in of a positive 
experience.”36 
Nature-mystical experiences have some internal conceptual differentiation just like 
Stace’s definitions of extrovertive experiences can have, even if actual thought-content 
and sensory stimuli are not required to be present. Subject and object are still present in 
the experience as there is a union or merging with something, which involves a 
differentiation. Mystic can experience that he is part of the Absolute reality, but there is 
also a “sense of different nexuses within the flow of becoming”.37 
Even if the mystical experiences themselves are paradoxical and ineffable, Stace believes 
that it is possible to rate them. According to Stace:  
 
The extrovertive type of mystical consciousness is in any case vastly less 
important that the introvertive, both as regards practical influence on human 
life and history and as regards philosophical implications.38  
 
And later he continues:  
 
“..it looks as if the extrovertive mysticism were a sort of incomplete version 
of the completeness realized in the introvertive kind. Consciousness or mind 
is a higher category than life, the top rung of the ladder of life. The 
extrovertive mystic perceives the universal life of the world, while the 
introvertive reaches up to the realization of a universal consciousness or 
mind.”39 
                                                          
36 Jones 1993: 19-20 
37 Jones 1993: 20 
38 Stace 1961: 62 
39 Stace 1961: 133 
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I cannot agree with Stace on this. Here we have a group of experiences where the 
multiplicity presented in the outside world is shown ultimately to be of the One source. 
Doesn’t this have great practical influence on human life? If everything around us in the 
world outside lies on this perceived Divine foundation, doesn’t it encourage respect and 
care in our actions dealing with the outside world? Doesn’t it give meaning to our own 
role as part of something much greater, in a way that no ordinary perception ever could? 
I do not see how extrovertive and introvertive experiences, even if the division is valid, 
are more or less valuable when it comes to practical influence on human life they can 
possess. Jones also seems to offer some support against Staces view:  
 
While some ordering of mystical experiences is inevitable, there is nothing 
inherent in the experiences themselves that requires a particular order. 
Mystical ways of life contain values that determine the significance assigned 
to each type of experience. For example, theistic traditions may devalue the 
depth-mystical experience as spiritual self-indulgence in favor of a continuing 
sense of the presence of God involved in nature-mystical experience. 
Similarly, other mystical traditions may value the permanent transformation 
resulting in a state of enlightenment-a nature-mystical states-over any 
transient experience, including the depth-mystical state. In each case, the 
various beliefs and values of the mystic’s way of life as a whole, not the 
experiences in isolation, determine the value given each type of experience.40 
 
Within each mystically enlightened way of life room must be made for both 
types of mystical experiences; yet, mystics value each type according to their 
goals and beliefs, and usually one type is valued more than the other. For 
instance, the medieval Christian Richard Rolle valued the “ravishment 
without abstention from the senses” over the “rapture involving abstention 
from the bodily senses”; the later even sinners have, but the former is a rapture 
of love that goes to God. A rapture without the senses may reach the ground 
of the individual self or of creation, but a sense of union is necessary to 
experience God. Thus a nature-mystical experience is valued by him over the 
depth-mystical experience. This contrasts with the release (moksa) of Advaita 
Vedānta. Here concentration (samādhi) leads to the stilling of all mental 
activity, is central, not any nature-mystical experience.41 
 
I strongly agree with Jones that personal goals and beliefs play a very important role and 
it is something that we must acknowledge when trying to understand different aspects of 
                                                          
40 Jones 1993: 4 
41 Jones 1993: 21-22 
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mysticism. Thus, we must try to avoid too strict categories when we explore the often 
paradoxical concepts found in the field of mysticism. It is for this reason that I will not 
embrace any limited set (nor types) of different mystical experiences for this study, but 
instead I will simply view and describe mystical experiences as non-ordinary experiences 
of fundamental states of self and/or reality. However I will still acknowledge the value 
of, and will use, the different characterizations for mystical experiences to help 
understand different aspects of mysticism that this study will explore in later chapters. 
But to me, the essence of mysticism and mystical experiences is the fundamental Reality 
they reveal. This will be my premise and main focus in the next two chapters.  
As I have mentioned several times, mystical experiences are inherently infused with 
problem of ineffability and how we can understand anything about their nature when, just 
by definition, they seem to be inconceivable. The answer to problems presented by 
ineffability are directly connected to the nature and the object of mystical experiences. I 
will next present and take part in a debate regarding the nature of mystical experiences. 
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3. NATURE OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES 
 
 
One of the dominant topics of contemporary scholarly mysticism is the debate between 
two opposing schools of thought, perennialism and constructivism42 regarding the nature 
of mystical experiences and the possibility of a common source for them even across 
traditional and cultural boundaries. Donald Rothberg writes: 
 
..two major philosophical questions that have dominated discussions of 
mysticism since William James: (1) Is there a core mystical experience, a 
universal experience common to humans across cultures and traditions? (2) 
Do mystical experiences give veridical insights into certain aspects of reality 
and into reality as a whole such that mystical claims should be accepted?43 
 
In this chapter the main focus is on the first question.44 I will present each of the 
participants and their arguments in this debate. Significant focus is placed on ineffability 
and noetic quality, the two main characteristics of mystical experiences as listed by 
William James and how they affect the debate. There have also been some more recent 
attempts to break out of the debate by forming a compromise between the positions. I will 
present a brief overview of Randall Studstill’s Mystical Pluralism as an example of such 
an attempt. 
Perennialists attempt to reveal and prove the existence of a universal core behind all 
mystical experiences by identifying commonalities even between mystical experiences of 
                                                          
42 I have chosen to use the terms ‘perennialism’ and ‘constructivism’ for these particular positions 
regarding mystical experience. However, in the literature of mysticism perennialistic position has also 
been called by different terms such as ‘non-constructivism’, ‘postconstructivism’, ‘decontextualism’ and 
perhaps most prominently ‘essentialism’. In general all these terms are identical or closely associated to 
a degree that the differences are reduced to mere connotations in regards to their focus on some specific 
aspect. Similarly, the ‘constructivistic’ position has been labeled for example as ‘anti-essentialism’ and 
‘contextualism’  See for example Gellman 2014 and Studstill 2005: 2 
43 Rothberg 1997: 167 
44 It should be noted that If (1) is found to have a positive answer, it would necessarily follow that (2) 
would be at least partly answered positively. For the existence of a universal core behind mystical 
experiences of different mystics coming from different religio-cultural backgrounds certainly constitutes 
as a “veridical insight into certain aspects of reality” just by itself. The veracity of “mystical claims” 
becomes problematic when their relation to the actual experience is considered. I will attempt to deal 
with this problem later in this chapter. 
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mystics with different traditional and cultural backgrounds. Reports by mystics regarding 
their mystical experiences can differ widely between mystics coming from somewhat 
similar (for example being “theistic”) or even identical (for example Yogācāra, 
consciousness-only school of Buddhism) traditional background. These differences are 
even more pronounced between mystics coming from different societal traditions and 
eras. A central tenet of perennialism is the distinction drawn between the experience itself, 
which the perennialist believes to be one and the same among all mystics, and the 
interpretation of the experience where the mystic uses the conceptual framework of 
his/her socio-linguistic, religious and spiritual tradition in describing the experience.  
Constructivists, in contrast, attempt to show that all experiences, including all so-called 
mystical experiences are not ‘pure’ experiences but instead a result of a complex cognitive 
framework that forms the very experience itself. In other words, perennialists defend the 
universality of the mystical experience as such, while acknowledging the presence of 
societal and cultural forces in shaping the post experience interpretation and description 
of those experiences. Constructivists, on the other hand, refuse to detach the mystical 
experience from the context in which it takes place. Instead, they believe that these 
psychological, societal and cultural forces are present already in shaping the mystical 
experience itself. 
 
3.1. Constructivism 
 
Forman gives a clear summary of the constructivist position: 
 
According to this constructivist paradigm, all experiences— prosaic, 
religious, artistic, mystical—are in significant ways formed, shaped, 
mediated, and constructed by the terms, categories, beliefs, and linguistic 
backgrounds which the subject brings to them. This notion has become so 
dominant that it has taken on the status of a self-evident truism.45 
 
This self-evident truism is clearly visible in the article by Steven Katz entitled “Language, 
Epistemology, and Mysticism” (1978). The article has been a centerpiece in the debate 
                                                          
45 Forman 1990: 4 
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between perennialism and constructivism. Katz begins his attack on perennialism by 
stating his “single epistemological assumption”: 
 
There are NO pure (i.e., unmediated) experiences. Neither mystical 
experience nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indication, or any 
grounds for believing, that they are unmediated. That is to say, all experience 
is processed through, organized by, and makes itself available to us in 
extremely complex epistemological ways. The notion of unmediated 
experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best empty. This 
epistemological fact seems to me to be true, because of the sorts of beings we 
are, even with regard to the experiences of those ultimate objects of concern 
with which mystics have had intercourse, e.g., God, Being, nirvana, etc .46 
 
This “epistemological assumption” taken by Katz does answer question (1) (Is there a 
core mystical experience, a universal experience common to humans across cultures and 
traditions?) with a definite “NO”. At the same time, Katz’s constructivist critique of 
question (1) leaves the question (2) (Do mystical experiences give veridical insights into 
certain aspects of reality and into reality as a whole such that mystical claims should be 
accepted?) largely untouched. However, he does argue that it is impossible to verify 
mystical claims “if by verification we mean the strong thesis that independent grounds 
for the claimed event/experience can be publicly demonstrated.”47 And from this it follow 
that: 
 
[…] no veridical propositions can be generated on the basis of mystical 
experience. As a consequence it appears certain that mystical experience is 
not and logically cannot be the grounds for any final assertions about the 
nature or truth of any religious or philosophical position nor, more 
particularly, for any specific dogmatic or theological belief.48 
 
Katz does not provide any actually usable verification criteria for mystical experiences 
and does not even attempt to justify his decision to use a criteria (public demonstration) 
that by definition is at odds with the whole concept of mystical experiences.49 
                                                          
46 Katz 1978: 26 emphasis in original 
47 Katz 1978: 22 
48 Katz 1978: 22 
49 He writes: ”I will not try to justify this position here” Katz 1978: 22 
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Furthermore, he writes that “[…] no philosophical argument is capable of proving the 
veracity of mystical experience.”50 I feel that under these premises it is not very 
productive to deal with Katz’s answer to Rothberg’s second question any further and 
instead focus on this self-evident truism itself that Katz and his fellow constructivists 
advocate. I will let Perennialism and their arguments challenge Katz later.  
The constructivist paradigm as a self-evident truism is blatantly obvious with him since 
he does not seem to give any valid reason or justification for his epistemological 
assumption in his article. Without further discussion, he proceeds to describe various 
mystical teaching of different religions and how these teachings actually construct the 
mystical experience itself. I do not deny the merits of constructivism when it comes to 
the matter of cognition and its ordinary, non-mystical operation. I would even concede 
that there are fields of study where the self-evident truism is, indeed, well founded and 
deserved notion. However, in my opinion the most problematic assumption Katz and 
other constructivists like for example Wayne Proudfoot make is the inherent similarity 
between mystical and non-mystical experiences. They do not seem to feel the need to 
justify in any way how their constructivist paradigm also applies to mystical experiences. 
To apply this type of self-evident truism to something that is everything but self-evident 
and deals with matters and concepts completely different from normal experiences is 
troubling. And it is not just Katz and Proudfoot, but it seems to me that no matter what, 
constructivist paradigm is inherently incapable of acknowledging any kind of special 
status to mystical experiences and for their paradigm to be relevant, all experiences need 
to be conceptual in nature. 
The unwarranted use of this self-evident truism by Katz has also been noted by many 
others, for example: 
 
Forman: “Once he has assumed that language enters and, in part, shapes and 
constructs all experiences, the remaining thirty-nine pages of the article 
provides virtually no further argumentation but only instances of this 
assumption.”51 
 
Philip Almond: “Katz seems to suggest that the relationship between a 
mystical experience and the context out of which it arises is a logically 
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51 Forman 1990: 15-16 
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necessary one, that the mystic cannot but experience in contextually 
determined ways. While one can agree with Katz that there is a strong 
contingent correlation between a mystical experience and its context, he has 
not given us any reasons that the connection is a necessary one. Consequently, 
he has failed to show how the mystical experience is constituted by the 
religious traditions out of which it arose.”52 
 
Perovich: “Although no one would doubt that the latter empirical studies form 
the fundamental basis for assessing the resemblances and differences among 
the experiences described in testimonies within the various religious 
traditions, it is only on the assumption of the formative influence of tradition 
on experience that these reports, employing the language suited to their 
religious contexts, can be taken as evidence of the variety of mystical 
experience without further ado. Hence, it is the philosophical side of the 
attack on which the rejection of the thesis of the universal core here 
depends.”53 
 
Jones also notes this a priori nature of constructivist approach to mystical experience even 
if he focuses mainly on his own definition of depth-mystical experiences: 
 
The only justification for constructivism is that it reflects the position most 
commonly accepted by philosophers concerning consciousness in non-
mystical experiences … However, constructivism was developed from 
nonmystical experiences without serious consideration of mystical 
experiences, and constructivists advance no independent arguments for why 
their theory must apply to all experiences, including depth-mystical 
experiences.54 
 
We have already seen that there are great many different ways that various authors have 
defined mystical experiences and in general the definitions themselves are in direct 
contrast to constructivism. But regardless of the particular definition that is being applied, 
mystical experiences are always considered to be very different from “normal”, non-
mystical forms of conscious experiences. I feel that this particular characteristic of 
mystical experiences cannot be stressed enough when it comes to challenging 
constructivists claims regarding the logically necessary contextual nature of mystical 
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experiences. Constructivists should somehow be able to move beyond their self-evident 
truism and show how mystical experiences actually are ordinary experiences despite their 
extraordinary characteristics.  Furthermore, there are mystical experiences, including the 
depth-mystical experiences of Jones, which are defined to be free of all conscious content. 
Here, constructivism is left with the sole option to deny even the mere possibility for the 
existence of these experiences since it is impossible to construct experience that has no 
content to begin with. Before examining how ineffability and noetic quality affect the 
constructivist paradigm, I will take a closer look at these non-conceptual experiences. 
 
3.1.1. Pure Conscious Events  
 
Forman calls experiences empty of all content ‘Pure Conscious Events’ (“PCEs”) which 
are similar to experiences in Stace’s ‘introvertive mysticism’ and Jones’s ‘depth-mystical 
experiences’. He defines PCEs as “a wakeful though contentless (nonintentional) 
consciousness.”55 PCE does not include any content, there is no object to be experienced 
nor is there subject that experiences. As Jones describes his depth-mystical experience:  
 
The second type of mystical experience occurs when the mind is completely 
stilled. According to mystics, this state is not unconscious, but is in fact an 
intensely conscious state. There is no awareness of any object or of any 
content of any kind yet there is still a realization of an ultimate reality.56 
 
Without any experiential content there is no work for the constructivist type of cognition. 
In accordance with reports given by some mystics, it seems that the mystical experience 
can even include the dissolution of the “self” and there is no longer any distinction 
between the subject and the object present to be philosophically or otherwise analyzed, 
how can we apply anything, such as anything related to constructivism that is based on 
such a distinction, to the experience? My answer is that we, indeed, cannot. We can no 
longer consider the subject (the mystic) as someone who constructs the object (mystical 
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object, absolute reality, whatever it might be) in any way or form, since there is no longer 
anything that constructs nor are there any forms that can be constructed.  
Forman describes his own PCE-experience as “unremarkable” but still considers it to be 
a proof for the existence of such experiences.57 Studstill argues against Forman at this 
very point and points out that mystical experiences are supposed to be anything but as 
trivial as to be called “unremarkable”.58 However, Forman’s own experience does not 
seem to be an actual mystical experience to begin with and he merely uses it as an example 
of an experience without any conscious content. As long as his experience was real and 
it was free from all content we can of course conclude that PCE is not sufficient 
characteristic to make experience mystical. Furthermore, he does provide examples of 
PCEs that similarly to Jones’ depth-mystical experience have “positive”59 results and 
seem more akin to actual mystical experiences..  
In my opinion Jones’ definition can be used as useful example of PCE as he takes it much 
further and is everything but unremarkable.60 However, it does also mean that PCEs as 
such do not describe the whole experience but only one, even if crucial part of it. Gellman 
points out that “[…] reports of “emptying out” and “forgetting” may refer only to an 
emptying of ordinary experiential content, making room for an extraordinary content.”61 
If this was the case, then constructivism that works under the naturalistic framework in 
explaining mystical experiences would be placed in a difficult position. 
 
3.1.2. Ineffability and Constructivism 
 
Ineffability is considered to not be just a defining characteristic of mystical experiences, 
but also something that is shared by all mystical experiences and thus paving way for the 
perennialist position. Constructivism needs to show that ineffability is not acceptable 
universal characteristic of mystical experience, and furthermore, if mystical experiences 
                                                          
57 Forman 1990: 28 
58 Studstill 2005: 27 
59 This is an understatement, however, examples that Forman gives are not really ‘mystical’, but instead 
just highly positive experiences. They are presented more as an argument against constructivism in 
general as clearly unmediated experiences. See Forman 1990: 27-28 
60 Jones’ depth-mystical experience and Forman’s PCE are clearly not the same experience. But I feel 
that the similarity of them being without content makes the comparison valid. 
61 Gellman 2014: para. 5.2 
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are ‘ineffable’, the constructivist position becomes difficult to sustain. William James 
describes ineffability: 
  
The Subject of it immediately say that it defies expression, that no adequate 
report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality 
must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. 
In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states 
of intellect.62 
 
Constructivist have tried to argue away the problem presented by ineffability. For Katz, 
ineffability is not even an acceptable characteristic of mystical experience. According to 
him, calling mystical experience ineffable does not inform anything about the context of 
the experience and only acts to “cloak the experience from investigation”, thus making it 
impossible to compare one mystical experience with another.63 However, in my opinion 
Katz is only half correct and the cloak only prevents us from taking the descriptions given 
us by mystics themselves regarding their experiences to actually be unmediated 
descriptions. When virtually all mystics acknowledge that their descriptions do not, and 
indeed cannot describe the fullness of what was experienced one can quite confidently 
use the repeatedly declared ineffability to be a characteristic of mystical experiences.   
Proudfoot, in his well-known work Religious Experience acknowledges that ineffability 
is widespread enough to deserve attention. According to him, ineffability is not part of 
the mystical experiences but something that is predetermined characteristic for the 
experience to be identified as a mystical experience (he actually refers to ‘religious’ 
experiences, but as his whole book is basically an argument against the possibility of 
unmediated experiences and because of his rather diluted notion of mystical experiences, 
he often uses the two interchangeably). To him the problem of ineffability is a logical 
one, and not something that is an inherent part of the experiences. He argues that 
ineffability is only to be seen as part of a particular “symbol system” and that “ineffability 
of an experience must result from its logical or grammatical component.”64 The main 
point he makes is that even if an experience is ineffable in regards to one symbol system, 
it could still be expressed via another system, chosen from a pool of “all linguistic 
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schemes”.65 This basically means that mystical experience, such as where no subject is 
present, or experience of unity where the self becomes part of totality of things is a simple 
matter of linguistic logic. This is quite a claim to make and something I see as impossible. 
It is his extremely diluted view of mystical experiences that makes it possible. It would 
be acceptable if he justified his constructivist position somehow, but like Katz, he does 
not. He only describes his position and presents it as a fact. Proudfoot66 talks about 
experience of sunyata (emptiness), that I see as a classic example of a non-conceptual 
mystical experience; there are no concepts, there is no “I”, there is no “you” and there is 
no “there”. I wonder which non-symbolic system Proudfoot would choose from “all 
possible symbolic systems” to be able to describe the actual ineffability away.  
William Alston, on the other hand, considers the whole topic of ineffability to have been 
“blown out of all proportion” and actually be rather irrelevant to mysticism. He believes 
that since mystics actually do proceed to describe their mystical experiences as something 
where they are aware of various features and activities of God as well as a variety of 
subjective features. Furthermore, he takes the common use of metaphors, analogies and 
symbolism of mystics’ descriptions to not point towards ineffability nor anything out of 
ordinary as they are also commonly applied to common experiences by non-divine, 
mundane necessities.67 He attempts to prove this by pointing out how the similarities and 
differences of phenomenal qualia of mystical experiences parallel “to an important 
extent” with ordinary sensory qualia: 
 
Touch, unlike seeing, involves a direct contact with the object; seeing reveals 
much more detail concerning the object and provides much more convincing 
view of its nature and identity. And some mystical perceptions involve a more 
intimate contact with God, while others reveal Him more fully.68 
     
He does make an interesting point. However, I feel that Alston fails to appreciate the “no 
adequate” –part of James’ definition. It is true that mystics indeed do use variety of 
                                                          
65 Proudfoot 1985: 126 
66 Proudfoot 1985: 127. Proudfoot sees concepts such as Tao, Brahman and Sunyata having “logical 
function” that acts to enhance the experience itself (p.128 and 135-136). He does not elaborate on the 
grammatical and logical role of these ineffable concepts enough to make it clear what kind of symbol 
system could be used. 
67 Alston 1993: 32  
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languages and proceed to write whole books about supposedly ineffable experiences. 
However, if my argument against Proudfoot is valid, it can also be used to argue against 
Alston here. No amount of words or symbols from all the possible language and symbol 
systems are capable of adequately describing the experience. It is possible to say that 
mystical descriptions such as “I saw God in Timeless Depth of Becoming” or “The 
Heavenly Pleroma sang to me of the Glory of the Unbegotten One” do tell us something, 
but the experience itself that prompted the mystic to use such words certainly takes a 
significant part of it beyond the core structures that our concepts and ordinary experiences 
are depending on. Furthermore, Alston fail to acknowledge the essential difference 
between the mystical experience and its interpretation, a matter which I will later examine 
in more depth with perennialism. 
 
3.1.3. Noetic Quality and Constructivism 
 
For James, the noetic quality of mystical experience is the other main defining 
characteristic and also something that is shared by all mystical experiences:  
 
Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who 
experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into 
depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, 
revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they 
remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for 
after-time.69 
 
Noetic quality acts to verify the experience itself to the mystic. Mystic knows that he is 
encountering the mystical object and that it is something other than a mere construct of 
his/her cognitive faculties. If James’ definition is correct and mystical experiences are 
“unplumbed by discursive intellect,” the intellectual space for the constructivist paradigm 
to work its mental constructions is further narrowed. Even if we give ground to 
constructivists and doubt the actuality of James’ claim about the total absence of 
discursive intellect, it seems that we cannot doubt that whatever power and work remains 
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for the discursive intellect during mystical experiences, has to work with something very 
foreign, totally other to itself. In my view, it remains reasonable to doubt the compatibility 
of the concepts required by constructivist consciousness with the concepts or non-
concepts given during the mystical experience. It similarly seems reasonable to 
acknowledge the likelihood or at the very least a possibility that mystical experiences are 
formed differently from normal experiences, thus casting serious doubt into the very basis 
for the whole constructivist paradigm. 
Katz argues against James’ notion that the noetic quality would provide a source for 
commonality between mystical experiences. According to him James “fails to recognize 
both the variety of 'insights' one could have into the 'depths of truth' and the variety of 
'truths' which can lurk in these depths waiting to be 'plumbed'.”70 Katz’s argument is not 
surprising and follows logically from his denial of the ineffable nature of mystical 
experiences. If ineffability is part of mystical experiences it would be quite surprising if 
there existed some universal conformity between mystics’ interpretations of such details 
of their experiences. However, as we shall later see, there actually is a conformity on a 
more general level which will act against Katz and his constructivist peers.  
Instead of focusing whether ‘truths’ inherent in the James’ noetic quality can be compared 
between different mystical experiences, Proudfoot argues that similarly to ineffability, 
noetic quality is a predetermined condition of the experience that shapes it. Mystic is 
“fully steeped in the attitudes and beliefs of his tradition.”71 These attitudes and beliefs 
also require the mystic to judge his/her experience as noetic, as a “conceptual constraint 
on what experiences may be identified as mystical.”72 My argument against Proudfoot 
regarding ineffability can also be applied against his understanding of the noetic quality. 
His diluted concept of mysticism and also of noetic quality is further proven as he later 
makes a strange claim about James’ use of noetic quality: “Ordinary perceptual judgments 
include an epistemic component. This is what James refers to as the noetic quality of 
religious experience.”73 Explanation for this claim is found on notes: “James refers to the 
noetic quality in mystical experience, but he regards mysticism as the name for the special 
manner in which religious persons have professed to see the truth. It is not restricted to a 
                                                          
70 Katz 1978: 49 
71 Proudfoot 1985: 137 
72 Proudfoot 1985: 148 
73 Proudfoot 1985: 170 
32 
 
narrow view of mystical experience.”74 The referred page from James says: “Religious 
persons have often, though not uniformly, professed to see truth in a special manner. That 
manner is known as mysticism.”75 He seems to misunderstand James by quite a huge 
margin. The actual concept of noetic quality as quoted above clearly shows James’ to 
consider it as something that is not related to ordinary “judgments” as Proudfoot would 
like to think, even if it would be required for his constructivist theory to hold.76  
In the end consciousness remains as a mystery. Certainly we have many theories trying 
to explain its parts or even the whole of it, but there is no all-encompassing “explanation 
of consciousness” that might make the constructivist position more laudable. Still, it is 
very human to claim that we know things for certain and even if we do not have the whole 
picture we still know enough to make all kinds of claims based on incomplete theories. 
This is all good and well in most cases and most scientific fields recognize their flaws, 
but when it comes to grand topics such as consciousness and universe, we can see from 
the history of science that paradigm shifts are not uncommon and always merciless to 
such attempts. 
Constructivism, which I by now consider to be buried in regards to this debate, can still 
certainly play a useful and meaningful role when dealing with recounting post-mystical 
experiences. However, as I see it, any attempt by constructivism to reach out to the 
mystical experience itself can only result in yes-no-yes-no argument powered by 
stubbornness based on a dogmatic world view that forces definitions on mystical 
experiences that remain ill-fitted. However, even if constructivist argument is not capable 
of achieving its aims, the perennialists have yet to validate their own views. 
 
 
                                                          
74 Proudfoot 1985: 246-247 
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76 It seems to me that constructivism just from its most basic premises becomes ”theory-ladenn” as there 
has to be something that is construed and some kind of theory by which the constructing of consciousness 
and experiences takes place. There are of course wide variety of “naturalistic explanations” available but 
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interprets everything through this explanation and every concept becomes something that he can apply. 
However, in so doing the original definitions become diluted and in the case of Proudfoot, he is not really 
talking about mystical experiences but more about the language and grammar that is used to describe his 
diluted version of them. 
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3.2. Perennialism 
 
PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS - the phrase was coined by Leibniz; but the thing 
- the metaphysic that recognizes a divine Reality substantial to the world of 
things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something 
similar to, or even identical with, divine Reality; the ethic that places man's 
final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent Ground of all 
being - the thing is immemorial and universal. 
                                     –Aldouns Huxley “The Perennial Philosophy” 
 
Perennialists believe that there is a universal core to be found behind mystical 
experiences. If perennialism has it right, that such a universal core of mysticism indeed 
exists, it would then not only have great epistemological meaning regarding how we 
understood the phenomenon of mystical experiences and to some extent consciousness in 
general. But also, albeit requiring bit of a soteriological leap, it could also have immense 
ontological ramifications if the universal core was what the mystics themselves claim it 
to be—Absolute Reality. However, under the obfuscating veil of ineffability it is no easy 
task. 
William James expresses his perennialistic view with fervor I feel is well deserved 
considering the scale and potential implications of the topic: 
 
This overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the 
Absolute is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both become 
one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the 
everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by differences of 
clime or creed. In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian 
mysticism, in Whitmanism, we find the same recurring note, so that there is 
about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic 
stop and think, and which brings it about that the mystical classics have, as 
has been said, neither birthday nor native land. Perpetually telling of the unity 
of man with God, their speech antedates languages, and they do not grow 
old.77 
 
One of the perennialists’ main methods in trying to show the existence of this “recurring 
note”; the universal core behind all mystical experiences is to seek similarities, some 
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“eternal unanimity” in the reports shared by mystics regarding their experiences. This 
method can, and indeed does, reveal something about mystical experiences. One can 
discover similarities and at the very least these similarities can further the study and 
understanding of mystical experiences through categories and aspects that are revealed 
through them.  
 
3.2.1. Ineffability and Perennialism 
 
As was the case with constructivists, perennialists also face and need to acknowledge the 
ineffability of mystical experiences and the problems it brings to understanding 
descriptions of mystical experiences by the mystics. Stace acknowledges the problem 
regarding ineffability of mystical experiences: “There is the difficulty that mystics usually 
say that their experiences are ineffable, incommunicable, and indescribable; after which 
they quite commonly proceed to describe them. What are we to make of this?” 78 
Stace argues that the problem of ineffability consist of two separate problems that need 
to be distinguished from each other to make the problem solvable. First problem is 
whether words and concepts can be applied during the mystical experience and second 
problem is whether they can be applied after the experience has occurred and it is 
remembered. Stace answers the first problem with a definite ‘no’: “Mystical experience, 
during the experience, is wholly unconceptualizable and therefore wholly unspeakable. 
This must be so. You cannot have concept of anything within the undifferentiated unity 
because there are no separate items to be conceptualized.”79 After the mystical experience 
is over and the mystic is back in “ordinary sensory-intellectual consciousness”, s/he is 
capable of remembering and conceptualizing the memories of his/her experience. It 
becomes possible to contrast the ordinary experience of remembering with the mystical 
experience and “speak of an experience as “undifferentiated,” as “unity”, as “mystical,” 
as “empty,” as “void,” and so on”.80 
Stace does acknowledge that mystics themselves find it difficult to conceptualize and put 
into words their mystical experience even after the experience, but points out that the 
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mystics actually do proceed to describe their experiences. Thus, according to Stace, their 
description must be capable of at least partially capturing some truth regarding the 
mystical experience itself: 
 
For either he does succeed in communicating at least some part of the truth 
about his experience, or his words are no better than a sound of escaping 
steam. If he does successfully communicate the truth about a part of his 
remembered experience, however small that part may be, then he must have 
given a true description of that part of his experience. And in that case he 
must be mistaken when he supposes that no language can ever apply to 
remembered mystical experience.81 
 
The problem is certainly not completely gone and depending on how “adequate” is 
understood, still in accordance with James’ definition of ineffability. It is clear that “some 
part of the truth” is not enough to contain the actual experience in full. After having 
established that there exists some connection between the actual and remembered 
experience Stace continues to examine the actual language used by mystics in their 
recollections. In contrast to Alston’s view presented earlier, he points out how there are 
several concepts being used by mystics to describe their experiences that are by no means 
metaphorical or symbolic but instead sound like literal descriptions.82 As an example, he 
uses John of Ruysbroeck:83: 
 
Ruysbroeck writes of the introvertive experience as "the darkness in which 
all lovers lose themselves." In general, "darkness" and "silence" are among 
the commonest of all metaphors used by mystics. Ruysbroeck's "darkness in 
which all lovers lose themselves" is a metaphor for what in his own language 
is elsewhere called the "undifferentiated unity." But "undifferentiated unity" 
is not in turn a metaphor for anything else. It has all the marks of literal 
language.84 
 
In my opinion Stace makes a convincing argument. Remembered mystical experience is 
able to reveal a small part of the actual experience. Also, the language that the mystics 
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use contain literal descriptions of their memory and can be used by perennialists to further 
their search and understanding of the universal core of mystical experiences. However, 
ineffability has not disappeared and in my opinion this is the place for the constructivist 
paradigm to shine. Mystics who often are part of well-defined traditions certainly use 
their respective language and concepts that need to be analyzed to gain full benefit of 
Stace’s approach.   
In the beginning of his book Stace presents two questions he sets out to answer. These 
questions are basically reworded versions of the two questions that were posed at the 
beginning of our own inquiry into this debate between perennialism and constructivism: 
  
1. Is there any set of characteristics, which is common to all mystical 
experiences, and distinguishes them from other kinds of experience, and thus 
constitutes their universal core? 
2. If there is such a universal core, is the argument for objectivity which has 
been based upon it a valid argument?85 
 
To begin answering these questions, Stace states that “there is only one way of doing this. 
We must quote a number of representative descriptions of their experiences which have 
been given by mystics, taking them from all historical times, places, and cultures, as 
widely separated as possible; and by an examination of these descriptions we must try to 
arrive inductively at their common characteristics, if there are any.”86 Stace proceeds to 
do such that and based on his analyses of mystics descriptions of their experiences he lists 
characteristics for both introvertive and extrovertive mystical experiences. Stace’s own 
list for the common characteristics for introvertive and extrovertive mystical experience 
was already presented in the third chapter. To remind us of this earlier discussion, and to 
provide a helpful comparison, we can examine a similar list based on Stace’s one that can 
be found from Rowe:87 
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Extrovertive mystical experience: 
1. Looks outward through the senses 
2. Sees the inner essence of things, an essence which appears to be alive, beautiful, and 
the same in all things 
3. Sense of unions of one’s deeper self with this inner essence 
4. Feeling that what is experienced is divine 
5. Sense of reality, that one sees things as they really are 
6. Sense of peace and bliss 
7. Timelessness, no awareness of the passage of time during experience 
 
Introvertive mystical experience: 
1. A state of consciousness devoid of its ordinary contents: sensations, images, thoughts, 
desires, and so forth 
2. An experience of absolute oneness, with no distinctions or divisions 
3. Sense of reality, that one is experiencing what is ultimately real 
4. Feeling that what is experienced is divine 
5. Sense of complete peace and bliss 
6. Timelessness, no awareness of the passage of time during the experience  
 
Similarly Happold, in a support of perennialistic view, finds four similarities that instead 
of referring to the defining characteristics of mystical experiences themselves, can be 
asserted from the more broad reflections of them by the mystics from “all ages”, “all parts 
of the worlds” and “all religions”:88 
 
1. This phenomenal world of matter and individual consciousness is only a 
partial reality and is the manifestation of a Divine Ground in which all partial 
realities have their being. 
2. It is of the nature of man that not only can he have knowledge of this Divine 
Ground by inference, but also he can realize it by direct intuition, superior to 
discursive reason, in which the knower is in some way united with the known. 
3. The nature of man is not a single but a dual one. He has not one but two 
selves, the phenomenal ego, of which he is chiefly conscious and which he 
tends to regard as his true self, and non-phenomenal, eternal self, an inner 
man, the spirit, the spark of divinity within him, which is his true self. It is 
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possible for a man, if the so desires and is prepared to make the necessary 
effort, to identify himself with his true self and so with the Divine Ground, 
which is of the same or like nature. 
4. It is the chief end of man’s earthly existence to discover and identify 
himself with his true self. By so doing, he will come to an intuitive knowledge 
of the Divine Ground and so apprehend Truth as it really is, and not as to our 
limited human perceptions it appears to be. Not only that, he will enter into a 
state of being which has been given different names, eternal life, salvation, 
enlightenment, etc.”  
 
In my opinion perennialism makes a very convincing case. Mystical experiences seem to 
form a unique group of experiences. Not only does Stace show that mystical experiences 
contain recurring characteristics that seem to be wholly ignorant of the self-evident truism 
of constructivist. Similarly, I find Happold’s arguments regarding unity of broader 
aspects of mysticism to be well founded, even if his points might be seen somewhat 
differently by various mystical traditions and by scholars of mysticism. In my opinion the 
possible conceptual differences result from traditional details and ineffability, and would 
be resolved in mystical experience and that is what matters. 
 
3.3. Mystical Pluralism 
 
The third option is a combination of both perennialistic and constructivist views presented 
by Randall Studstill in his book Unity of Mystical Traditions. He sees that the debate and 
the related study of mysticism “is at an impasse” and that “no one has been able to 
formulate an argument sufficiently compelling to persuade anyone but the already-
converted.”89 The main thesis of mystical pluralism is that different mystical traditions 
and practices function in similar ways and all mystics go through essentially the same 
transformative process.90 However, going against perennialistic position, the 
phenomenological content of the different mystical experiences is not seen as identical. 
According to Studstill, mystical experiences are “more or less mediated by the conceptual 
belief system of the mystic.”91 
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However, he does regard “most advanced stage of mystical realization” as an 
exceptionthat in my opinion makes mystical pluralism part of perennialism rather than 
any actual alternative.92 As I see it, the entire perennialistic position is built on these most 
advanced mystical realizations and from their point of view these ‘less advanced’ 
experiences are not even essential part of the debate. What Studstill is proposing is not an 
actual compromise to the ongoing debate, but instead a completely new debate that 
incorporates a broader definition for mystical experiences. The lower categories of 
mystical experiences would remain the domain of constructivists whereas and the higher 
category would be reserved solely for the perennialists. I trust that perennialists would 
likely welcome Studstill’s mystical pluralism as they could just ignore any lower forms 
of mystical experiences and just keep on doing what they have been doing all along. 
Constructivists on the other hand, would most certainly refuse this categorization as the 
possibility for unmediated experiences is still present. 
In my opinion, mystical pluralism does provides a feasible approach, but it does not 
manage to separate itself from perennialism and in the end does not work as a viable third 
alternative. Studstill himself seems to mostly ignore the highest form of mystical 
realization and, consequently, as a compromise between perennialism and constructivism 
mystical pluralism does not really work.93 
 
3.4. In Conclusion 
 
There a lot at stake in the debate between perennialism and constructivism. The 
approaches and implications of their premises take the whole topic of mysticism and 
mystical experiences to absolutely opposite directions. Constructivism sees mystical 
experiences being no different from ordinary experiences at their core and promote 
naturalistic interpretations as the only valid approach to mysticism. Perennialism, on the 
other hand see mysticism as a separate and unique field of study. They attempt to face the 
mystical experiences at the same level as the mystics themselves and in the end 
implicating more or less directly that mystical experiences possess at least some truth 
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value even to non-mystics, and the universal core behind the experiences is a valid object 
for philosophical inquiries. I believe that I have effectively shown that constructivism and 
their naturalistic approach has no other grounds besides their self-declared, ideologically 
based self-evident truism. Perennialism on the other hand clearly shows that mystical 
experiences do deserve to be regarded as a phenomena outside of the naturalistic 
framework. Furthermore, and in my opinion most importantly, perennialism justifies the 
notion that something is answering the mystics’ calls. Something, the mystical Core, is.  
In my opinion, perennialism has succeeded well in establishing the existence of universal 
core behind mystical experiences. However, I do not think that they have managed to 
convincingly show anything about this universal core besides that it is there. The 
uniformity of experiences is undeniable and something is reacting to the mystics’ calls. 
This is no small achievement. Perennialism does show us that mystical experiences form 
a special group of experiences that is totally other and outside of the realm of ordinary 
consciousness, i.e. perennialism validates the existence of mystical experience as an 
actual phenomenon that is incommensurable with ordinary experiences and should be 
treated as such. Even if the mystics themselves have a clear advantage over the rest of us 
concerning its nature, it is thanks to perennialism that we are in a better position to 
discover something of its nature based on the many men and women who have attained 
the mystical heights and come back to share their encounter. 
When dealing with experiences of any kind from different periods, lands and cultures the 
constructivist paradigm should not, and cannot, be ignored. As I have already 
acknowledged, the constructivist paradigm does have a major, if not definitive, role when 
dealing with normal, non-mystical experiences. Constructivism also plays a role in how 
the mystics reflect and report their mystical experience after the experience itself. I 
believe that when describing the mystical experience, a vast gap of ineffability remains 
between the actual content of mystical experience (filled with concepts and non-concepts 
foreign to the conceptual scheme of the describing mind) and the attempts to recapture it 
by words afterwards. The absolute oneness of one mystic remains ever separated from 
the absolute oneness of the other when attempting to gain definite hold of the universal 
core perennialists are after. 
However, even if I find that the ineffability and the total otherness of the concepts and 
non-concepts encountered during mystical experiences prevent definite characterizations 
of the potential universal core behind them, I do believe that it would be foolish to ignore 
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the common elements that all mystical experiences share. These commonalities exist even 
though these experiences that can be defined in many ways have appeared in different 
periods, lands and cultures. There is something clearly there and no leap of faith, 
soteriological or intellectual should be required to see it. Something is and has been 
answering to the calls of truth seeking mind of mystics with these peculiar and elusive 
group of experiences grouped under the notion of being “mystical.”  
On matter of the scale and uniqueness of mystical experiences one should look for 
possibilities (perennialism) instead of impossibilities (constructivism). Via negativa is a 
powerful path, but cutting too many routes one risks ending up in in dead end with 
nowhere to go expect back, and that requires admittance of failure which is not too 
common in academic, nor religious circles. Building on this perennialist premise of 
“something is there”, in the next chapter I will attempt to get a hold of this something, 
this object of mystical experiences.  
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4. THE MYSTICAL OBJECT  
 
 
Perennialism by itself is not capable in establishing any definitive details about the object 
of the mystical experience. I believe it would be a mistake to use characteristics of 
mystical experiences as those given by Stace as concrete descriptions of the mystical 
object itself. These descriptions certainly can help in the search for the nature of the 
mystical object but to call it “oneness” or “absolute” based on the mystics’ descriptions 
is not without problems and in the end, does not reveal anything beyond what the various 
definitions for mystical experiences have been telling us all this time. However, I feel that 
perennialism does validate mystical experiences as an actual phenomenon occurring 
outside of ordinary cognitive faculties and that mystics do encounter something in their 
visions. This also validates and begs the question of what it is that the mystics encounter; 
what is it that gives rise to these experiences, what is the object of the mystical experience.  
 
4.1. The Other 
  
What is the object of mystical experience? It has been called “Fundamental Reality”, “The 
One”, “God”, “The Truth” and by many other names. I have decided to call it The Other.94 
The Other, to me, reflects well the nature of this otherworldly object of mystical 
experience, which by its very nature is totally different, totally other from the objects of 
normal, non-mystical experiences. In my view, we as human beings are not just prisoners 
inside the conceptual cage of our cognition but we are also bound by the framework that 
comes with the physical nature of our world as well as our biological existence with its 
functions and limitations. The Other, the source and object of the mystic visions, 
transcends everything that resides on this physical side of the cloud of unknowing. It lies 
outside and above the mental cage of our conceptual prison that seems to prevent us from 
reaching it. The Other is not “here”. 
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Object cannot really get any more elusive than the object of mystical experiences. It 
eludes not just the physically grounded concepts we possess but it also entails that even 
the knowledge we can have about it within and through mystical experience eludes the 
conceptual framework of our ordinary, non-mystical cognition. It appears that during the 
mystical experience the mystic him/herself is able to reach this elusive object—The 
Other—and in some mystical way this contact also possesses noetic qualities leaving no 
room for doubt in the mystic regarding the actuality of the encounter. This is the core of 
acquiring mystical knowledge, leaving us non-mystics with a problem of how to evaluate 
and validate this type of knowledge that is only fully accessible to mystics themselves.  
Before attempting to gain some form of understanding of the Other, I believe it is useful 
to begin by examining the implications rising out of perennialism as part of our effort to 
reach out towards the Other. As stated—and hopefully adequately justified—in previous 
chapter, I find that there is at least some truth behind the perennialistic position. 
Something truly is somewhere, allowing and giving rise to these types of experiences that 
we call mystical. The truth of perennialism, even when stripped to its most bare form 
gives us a base from which to proceed first towards the world and ourselves in light of 
mysticism and with some reservation towards the Other itself.  
Happold presents us with two fundamental convictions that perennialism rests on:95  
 
1. Though it may be to a great extent atrophied and exist only potentially in 
most men, men possess an organ or faculty which is capable of discerning 
spiritual truth, and, in its own spheres, this faculty is as much to be relied on 
as are other organs of sensation in theirs. 
2. In order to be able to discern spiritual truth men must in their essential 
nature be spiritual; in order to know That which they call God, they must be, 
in some way, partakers of the divine nature; potentially at least there must be 
some kinship between God and the human soul. 
 
I see no reason not to agree with Happold on the first one. Mystical experiences as an 
actually existing phenomenon mean that there is something in the mystic, something in 
their being that gives rise to and makes mystical experiences possible. Happold’s second 
conviction is already very close to concepts outside of our normal conceptual scheme. 
                                                          
95Happold 1990: 21  
44 
 
This is evidenced by his references to vague concepts including “some way” and “some 
kinship”, which seem to acknowledge and respect the deep gulf between us and the Other. 
However, the necessary vagueness does not diminish the fact that it seems that there, 
indeed, has to exist some connection, even if its nature happens to be ineffable, between 
us, or at the very least between mystics during their mystical experience and the Other.  
Most mystics come from some specific religious and cultural tradition. These traditions 
again tend to come with a vast and specific set of doctrines and teachings regarding the 
nature of the God(s), Ultimate Reality and whatever beings or states of being and 
existence happen to be embedded at the top of their respective existential hierarchies. 
Religious doctrines make various claims with varying reservations regarding not just the 
nature of the fundamental reality but also the role of humans and their relation to such 
reality. With this in mind, to proceed, we need to ask the obvious question:  
Is there a possible or even necessary connection between the religious truths and the truth 
of the Other revealed to mystic during the mystical experience?  
I believe that even if mystics, who are coming from different religions and traditions, 
actually connect and experience the same fundamental object, it would not necessarily 
mean that their religious doctrines and teaching are correct and true even including 
doctrines and teaching that these different religions and traditions share. Neither do I 
believe that perennialism immediately should lead us to deny the teachings and doctrines 
that are not universal between traditions. But it is important to recognize the overlap 
between different religious texts and mystical experiences. There are some teachings 
found in different religions and more particularly in their religious texts that seem to be 
directly related to mystical experiences and mystical claims.  
It is no big surprise that religions incorporate numerous mystical elements in their 
teachings. It seems only natural that absolutes, with which mysticism so closely deals 
with, are also necessary elements when it comes to belief about fundamental states of 
being and existence which are essential and regular subject-matters for religions. God or 
some being or state of being is typically placed at the top of the existential hierarchy of 
any tradition. This entails that this highest state of being is not supposed to have anything 
above it, which leads to the deployment of descriptive concepts, which are also particular 
to mysticism.  
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I am not in a position to speculate how mystics and mystical experiences might have acted 
in forming many religious doctrines but it seems reasonable to assume that religious 
thought and mystical thought are often somehow related, mysticism only goes further, 
beyond mere doctrines that tend to form the non-mystical soteriological limit. This is not 
to say that I believe this relation to be necessary one. I take this view, firstly, because 
different religious backgrounds do not seem to determine the mystical experience itself, 
as we have learned from perennialism. Secondly, there are cases of mystics that are not 
deeply, if at all, indoctrinated to any specific religious system. Thirdly, there are many 
examples of mystics whose visions reveal truths that seem to go directly against the 
doctrines of their own traditions. 
What I believe to be the core necessity to reach mystical experience is a belief in the 
existence of the Other, a belief that one can gain access to it and, lastly and most 
importantly, a deep desire to experience it. A belief into the existence of the Other and 
desire to reach an experience involving the Other are things that are often encouraged by 
religious and spiritual traditions. However, in religious traditions the desire to be closer 
to (and even experience) the Other is typically not understood as a direct experience of 
the divine but as something less mystical and more faith-based and faith-affirming in 
nature. 
However, most mystics whose experiences have reached literature do stem from one 
religious tradition or another; something that must not be overlooked. Detailed overview 
of religious thought in different religions is outside the scope of this study, but it seems 
clear that religiosity, at least on some level acts to inspire and accommodate mystical 
pursuits regardless of specific doctrines. Most mystics seem to have gone through 
tremendous effort to reach the state of being where they are able to achieve mystical 
experience of the Other. But there are also cases where mystical experience seems to 
reflect a spontaneous reaction rather than be a result of a deliberate mental effort.  This 
suggests that it may be possible that the desire or some closely related emotion by itself 
is enough to gain access to the Other. 
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4.2. Divine Point of View 
 
When considering the characteristics and attributes of the Other, it seems that 
philosophers and theologians alike often seem to mix the human and what I like to call 
the divine point of view. For example, the very theistic notion of God inevitably being 
ultimately morally good seems to rely on a very questionable, even if it is doctrinally 
based assumption that God and humans share a view on morality that is comparable. No 
matter if God created mankind to reflect his image (whatever myriad things that can 
mean), our human morality is hardly absolute as anyone can notice at his or her first 
glance of humanity. Certainly humans, who generally tend to value their lives and 
existence as meaningful and important, no doubt view such things as violence towards, 
or causing the death of, a fellow human being, as morally wrong. The purpose of this 
study is not to explore and declare what morality actually is. But morality as a concept 
offers us a good example of how the religious and even philosophical background 
framework of the subject can force unnecessary attributes to the object of the mystical 
experience, to the Other. From the divine point of view, one lifespan and its ending (be it 
untimely or not) could very well be “seen” as absolutely meaningless. I believe we should 
at the very least assume, if not declare, the incommensurability between human and divine 
point of views.  
When we talk about knowledge or cognitive functions of any kind or form, we must not 
assume that the divine point of view—the divine way of knowing and understanding—is 
in any way similar to human way of knowing and understanding. When considering the 
nature of the Other, the attributes and concept we use to define it have to always be 
considered primarily from the divine point of view as the human point of view can only 
act as a sort of a practical supplement but not as a truth-giving position. The mystical 
experiences themselves should make this very clear. They are called mystical for just this 
very reason that they are not ordinary, not even familiar to/with ordinary, and not capable 
of being captured by a normal human cognition. 
The ineffability of mystical experiences is a clear example of this. From human point of 
view, we experience something that we are in the end, incapable of fully describing using 
our (human) point of view. That is, using conceptual scheme available for, and limited to, 
human cognitive capabilities. To truly know absolutes you have to become absolute 
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yourself. This might, indeed, be possible during a moment of mystical experience when 
the human point of view with its subject–object separation, along with other limiting 
factors are no longer present, and the experience is possibly similar or at least no longer 
incommensurable to that of a divine point of view. Absolutes are only fully known to 
absolute minds. It is a great and unfortunately very common misconception, even 
arrogance, in humans to declare anything else. Happold approaches this topic in a similar 
way through the concept of union commonly present in Christian mysticism:96  
 
This other kind of knowledge is based on something which can only be called 
'union'. The more subject and object, the observer and that which is observed, 
merge into each other, that is, are 'united' with each other, the more profound 
and illuminating the knowledge becomes; and the less it becomes capable of 
description. The knowledge we may have of God is knowledge of this sort; 
but it goes beyond it; for God can only be fully known by becoming God, by 
taking Him into the inmost self as the fulfillment of that self, and by the self's 
being taken fully into the divine life and being transformed therein. 
 
It is clear that the type knowledge we are reaching out for here is ultimately beyond 
normal means available to ordinary and non-mystical cognition, but it is not my intent to 
claim that only mystics are allowed to understand anything at all about the Other. The 
mystical experience itself, and direct awareness and knowledge gained during it, certainly 
is solely the domain of mystics. However, we who remain outside these experiences can 
still reach out towards the Other, its nature and its meaning.  
There are two common ways that have been used to approach and attempt to understand 
and say something about the nature of the God (the Other): via negativa (way of negation) 
of apophatic theology and way of affirmation of kataphatic theology. The apophatic 
theology approaches the Other by attributes it does not have. It is an attempt to understand 
the God by understanding what it is not. This can be contrasted with kataphatic theology, 
where God is approached using positive terminology. An example of an apophatic 
approach would be to say that God is not evil or that God is not created. In contrast, 
Kataphatic theology can, for example, make a claim that God is love. These claims are 
based on scriptures and other teachings based on the religion and tradition in question. In 
mysticism there is a similar division between apophatic and kataphatic mysticism. 
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Apophatic mysticism focuses on the ineffability of mystical experiences. In the end, it 
declares that nothing can be said about the Other, the object of the mystical experience. 
In contrast, kataphatic mysticism makes claims about the object of mystical experiences, 
such as God is All in one and One in all.97 
When examining the nature of the mystical object I have decided to seek its potential and 
necessary attributes without taking any ready-made definitions from any existing 
theology or school of thought for granted, whether mystical or not. As per apophatic 
mysticism we must acknowledge the ever present ineffability of mystical experiences. 
And in the spirit kataphatic mysticism we must also acknowledge that even if mystical 
experiences can never be adequately described they do seem to also contain some 
universality as perennialists have shown. 
 
4.3. Attributes of the Other 
 
As said, I see no reason to limit myself to any specific theology when trying to say what 
The Other is, can be, could be or has to be. However, I will have to make the assumption 
that the Other is and its being is fundamental as it is not caused by anything what I would 
call common or explainable through normal (non-mystical) rules of causality. I will also 
assume, even if I have already provided supporting evidence for it in my discussions on 
perennialism, that The Other (or at least parts of it) can be experienced and has been 
experienced in the mystical visions of the mystics throughout the history.  
What is actually known in mystical vision, what is its object? This is a relatively easy 
question if and when you come from some specific tradition or theology that has an 
existing framework on where and how to place this fundamental being, state, reality or 
whatever it might be in that particular tradition. I feel that it is necessary not to assume 
any sort of ready-made conceptual-religious-spiritual premise, as there are plenty of 
variations out there, ranging from the theistic to pantheistic kinds. However, I do believe 
that it can be productive to compare and contrast mysticism and its object to traditional 
and existing religious thoughts and concepts of the divine.  
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I will next attempt to examine and contrast some attributes common to theistic God with 
mysticism with the goal of illuminating whether and how they relate to the possible and 
necessary attributes of the Other, while trying to acknowledge the limitations of the 
human point of view and the otherness of the divine point of view.  
 
4.3.1. Is It? 
 
To begin our inquiry into the attributes of the Other, I will present St. Anselms idea about 
God being self-existent:98 
Anselm saw 3 categories for everything that exists.  
(a) things that are explained by another  
(b) Things that are self-explaining  
(c) Things that are explained by nothing.  
According to Anselm (a) is not good enough for God. It is the same for our subject matter, 
the Other, as there exists no “another” for it. At first glance, (c) is also not possible for 
everything needs to have a reason for its existence. I do agree with the notion but in the 
case of the Other, the “nothing” would have to be the “nothing” of the divine point of 
view.  That leaves (b), and with the help of Anselm I will accept it to be part of the 
fundamental reality, part of the Other. It could also be that from the divine point of view 
(b) and (c) are one and the same. I would not be surprised to hear mystic say “Divine 
nothing is Everything it is” or something similar. However (b) remains as something we 
can at least try to understand non-mystically.  
What it actually means for something to be self-explaining is more difficult, for now I 
will limit its meaning to just mean that the Other does not belong to things described in 
(a) and (c) as far as human point of view allows it. I do not have the confidence to take a 
leap of faith into concluding what self-explaining could mean to the Other, as I believe it 
would necessarily require divine point of view to be successful. However, I do feel 
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confident to say that the self-explaining indeed requires divine causality, that is, concepts 
only available to divine, absolute mind.  
The assumption that the mystical experiences are true and that they are actually 
experiences of a fundamental reality leads to first necessary attribute of the Other. The 
Other is something that is able to be experienced. Given this, there must be a connection 
between the mystic and the Other consistent with Happold’s first fundamental conviction 
for perennialism. But the detailed and all-encompassing nature of this connection 
manages to elude the grasp of pure reasoning as it is even capable of disintegrating the 
subject-object dichotomy of the experience. This, I believe, is well reflected by the 
vagueness of Happold’s second fundamental conviction. But it is not to say that reason 
cannot say anything about it. From the fact that the Other can be experienced we can 
reason that it exists, even if the precise mode of its existence seems to be beyond and 
above our human point of view, our conceptual framework to capture the depth and the 
nuance of the experience with the Other. However I believe that even if we have to add 
the vagueness of “some way” as a mode of existence, it is still a very powerful statement. 
To me “The Other exists” is true conclusion. When we strip the concept of ‘existing’ to 
its barest form possible, it cannot be attributed to anything else except that it is. We cannot 
give it any other meaning, shape or form. 
Of course I am assuming that the mystical experience is a real phenomenon and that 
something in the mystics does, indeed, come in contact with the fundamental reality. I 
am, however, convinced that the truth of perennialism—to the extent I have shown it— 
gives reason enough to justify the assumption. I feel it is important to try to see what the 
object of their experience could be, or has to be, what the necessary and possible attributes 
of the Other can be—besides the necessity of ‘potentiality of being experienced’.  
When we acknowledge the possibility for noetic clues regarding the nature of the Other 
given us by mystics throughout the ages, and the necessity to separate the human and 
divine point of views—together with the need to ignore the revelatory and dogmatic 
nature of the theological concepts for the divine—we can apply our human point of view 
regarding the widely accepted attributes of the God. This human point of view must be, 
and effectively is, humble in a sense that it acknowledges the distance between our normal 
cognitive capabilities and the ineffable realms of the Other. When our concepts are not 
capable of reaching it, we have to cherish that as a one concrete fact we can use to 
understand our own position. 
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4.3.2. Omnibenevolence and Omniscience  
 
The God of the Old Testament is a very active, and obviously cognitively active, being. 
It does things, it wants things and it even gets angry at times raining fire and brimstone 
upon those who he is displeased with when he does not get what he wants. Clearly it is a 
being with a consciousness and human like cognitive activity of some sort. But is it 
necessary for the Other to have consciousness and cognitive activity? First we must 
remember that our understanding of consciousness and cognition come from the human 
point of view and should not be applied to match that of the divine point of view without 
careful consideration and at the very least acknowledging the difference between the two.  
What it would mean for The Other to know something? What it would mean for 
something that is Absolute to think about anything? If what is experienced during 
mystical experience is any hint to the cognitive mode of the absolute being, we can pretty 
much give up trying to get hold of it non-mystically. There is little we can say about a 
reality apprehending cognition. We can, of course, say that there indeed is very little, if 
anything, we can possibly say about it. We can also conclude that if the Other is aware of 
everything, if it is omniscient, the mode of the Other’s knowing differs from any type of 
knowing we can apprehend using the concepts available to us. It is certainly possible to 
make assumptions and speculate about divine cognition, but I believe it can be 
conclusively said that omniscience as it can be understood through our human point of 
view with its conceptual limitations is not necessary attribute for the Other.  
Our inability to comprehend divine cognition with our human conceptual scheme also 
means that it is impossible for us to fully understand divine morality. In scriptures we can 
read about rules and guidelines that tell a tale of a God with human like morality or at the 
very least morality we can comprehend, but how could such a being share our concepts 
when it comes to questions of morality? I claim it cannot. We should also not force our 
own morality to it when trying to understand the nature of such a being. Most moral and 
ethical questions rely on the temporal nature of the existence of us humans and the world 
surrounding us, focusing on our actions and their consequences. However, a being whose 
existence at least potentially lies beyond temporality might very well not even be capable 
of being evaluated through such temporally based morality. 
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The problem of evil is especially problematic for theistic God and it is often seen as the 
most damning evidence against God. The problem seems to rise when God is considered 
to be both omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Lot of terrible things happen in the world all 
the time and it is certainly difficult to reconcile that fact with omnibenevolent and 
omnipotent God. Why would such being allow evil to exist? One answer comes in form 
of afterlife where good deeds are rewarded in heaven and evil gets what is due in hell. As 
was already mentioned above, the divine point of view is capable of removing the 
problem; any amount of suffering can be infinitesimal or even non-existent from the 
divine point of view. Lifelong suffering is infinitesimal when compared to eternity and 
non-existent when compared to a mode of being that does not even possess any concepts 
related to suffering and evil. 
Even after acknowledging the vast gulf between human and divine cognition, I believe it 
is possible to use mysticism to build enough stepping stones to validate an assumption 
for the possibility, and even likelihood, of a relation between the Other and human 
morality without a major leap of faith to close the gap. Jones writes: 
 
Moral action-guides are usually an integral part of mystical traditions’ path to 
enlightenment (since such actions lessen a sense of self-centeredness). How 
morality on such paths would relate to the mystic’s enlightened state is not 
clear. If morality is an integral part of the unenlightened life, must it be part 
of the enlightened life? Or does the mystic in enlightenment transcend 
morality? That is, is morality merely a tool on the unenlightened path that 
loses its significance after enlightenment? Is morality part of the temporal and 
not the eternal?99 
 
It seems clear that these moral action-guides play a significant role in reaching mystical 
experience and thus enlightened state (as Jones defines it: “knowledge of the fundamental 
truths of the nature of reality and a life in accordance with them”). Since these moral 
action-guides have such an important role in approaching the Other, I believe it is enough 
to validate an assumption for the relation, but not identity between the Other and human 
morality. Jones continues with valid questions, but we will not be pursuing them further. 
For now, and in relation to morality, I will conclude that there is a possible connection 
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between the ability to experience the Other and morality even if we cannot say anything 
conclusive about the morality of the Other.  
 
4.3.3. Omnipotence 
 
Omnipotence is a necessary God’s attribute for theistic theology since their God is seen 
as an active creator and sustainer of everything that exists. I see no reason to think that 
the Other could not be omnipotent in a sense that it could have the power or ability to 
bring out any state of affairs. At the same time, I see no reason for omnipotence to be a 
necessary attribute of the Other. This is a clear example of how human point of view 
forces itself to the notion of the Other (God). We as human beings do things, our whole 
life is in a sense, that of doing. And thus the concept of power (as in capability) makes 
sense to us, as we can do some things while we cannot do other things because we lack 
some necessary requirements or capabilities for its successful accomplishment. 
Sometimes we succeed and sometimes we do not, depending on various factors. Once 
again we can see that the God of scriptures (Old Testament) who “does things” is very 
human like and potentially the main source of this notion of omnipotence as a necessary 
attribute for God. We just cannot accept an absolute being that is actually active and does 
something but ends up failing to do it. “Doing” anything at all already fixes the whole 
topic into the realm of human point of view as I believe that the whole concept of doing 
is not a necessary concept for the Other. Doing something in general requires causality or 
at the very least some sort of temporal activity and existence. The Other would be of one 
kind at one moment and of another kind the next, which would make the Other relative 
instead of absolute. It would also force the Other to the subject–object dichotomy, which 
clearly is an ontological step with no grounds and thus would most likely take us to an 
endless path with no real (or at least useful) answers. Here, of course, I am attributing 
human point of views myself. In the end, any talk about the omnipotence of God, the 
Other becomes meaningless in regards to any fixed ontological status since such status 
would require to be grounded on human point of view. 
Forcing human point of view and concepts stemming from it to things that do not adhere 
to them gives us unnecessary dilemmas regarding the Other and its absolute counterparts, 
however they are named. One popular example would be the question if omnipotent God 
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can create a stone so heavy that it cannot lift it itself. When we look at this question after 
separating the divine and human point of views, we can say that from the divine point of 
view it is not necessary for God to manifest such attributes as creating stones and lifting 
stones. From this point of view, God is fully capable of not doing such things and still 
remain absolute. It is the human point of view that makes the question problematic. Of 
course, even from the human point of view the dilemma can be approached. For example, 
St. Thomas Aquinas pointed out that there are two different kinds of possibilities when it 
comes to God “doing all things possible”. Relative possibility means that the possibility 
to do something is relative to a specific being, for example birds’ possibility to fly where 
humans cannot fly. Absolute possibility on the other hand is something that is not 
contradictory like classic example of a married bachelor. Aquinas states that God’s 
omnipotence is in regards to absolute possibilities, which means that everything that does 
not involve such contradiction of terms is within Gods power.100  
In conclusion, I would say that omnipotence as it is understood from human point of view 
is just not a necessary attribute of the Other, but also a very unlikely attribute.  
 
4.3.4. Eternality 
 
Time and eternality provide one of the greatest and most intriguing paradoxes. What, if 
anything was before existence? This question is inherently tied to problem of creatio ex 
nihilo; how can anything be born out of nothing. Science has made very exotic attempts 
to push back the beginning and/or attempted to attribute characteristics such as laws of 
nature to the supposed timeless void that was before time. But in the end it seems that the 
only valid answer to the paradox is eternality; there never was any beginning and what is 
now has always been. And this is of course only substituting one paradox with another. 
How can it be “now” if there has been infinite amount of time before it? It seems to me 
that the only satisfying answer to the paradox of time and beginning is to acknowledge 
that from the human point of view the mystery of time and eternality is now and forever 
beyond our ordinary conceptual capabilities. 
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I feel that eternality of the Other is very similar to its self-existence since similarly to 
existence, time is a concept that very well might not fit the Other insofar as we can 
understand time and temporality from our human point of view. However I feel that we 
can say that the Other does not fit well with temporal concepts of beginning and end. The 
Other has to be eternal but we cannot say what it actually means from human point of 
view. From divine point of view the concept can very well lose its meaning. In the end, I 
feel it is better to just humbly marvel at the mystery of existence; on the other hand those 
capable and brave enough to pursue the mystical path can hope to witness the timelessness 
of mystical experiences and for a brief moment know the eternal. Furthermore, paradoxes 
presented by time, eternality and creatio ex nihilo clearly bring forth the limitations of 
human point of view. There is something utterly mystical in the mere fact that existence 
exists.   
 
4.5. Absolute and Limited Absolutes 
 
During the mystical experience, the mystic experiences something that we can label as 
‘absolute’ based on mystics’ descriptions of the experience. All is one. One is all. 
Everything is I. I am Everything. It is no-thing, which is everything. Even if non-mystics 
do not have direct access to mystical experiences or memories of them, there is a wide 
variety of mystical descriptions that can certainly, if not necessarily, be interpreted as 
experiences of the absolute. But the question arises whether the Other that mystics 
experience as absolute being or state is necessarily absolute.  
William Kingsland defines absolute as something “which has nothing relative to it, and 
is therefore unitary or all-comprehensive in its nature”. And as Kingland points out, this 
is something that is directly in opposition to our normal way of experiencing the reality.101  
We live in a reality and possess a type of consciousness, which relies on relativity and 
multiplicity to make the reality and the type consciousness we possess possible and 
comprehensible at least in some way and to some degree. This vast and deep gulf between 
the “normal” world of relations and the mystics’ world of unity is, I believe, the main 
source of the ineffable nature of the mystical experiences. The world and consciousness 
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that relies on relativity is by definition in a difficult if not impossible position to produce 
concepts that can bridge the gulf to a world with no such relations.  
Mystics themselves certainly tend to liken their experiences to that of an absolute even if 
it remains obscured behind the veil of ineffability of our own conceptual making. 
However, even if the concept of absolute remains at least partly hidden to our non-
absolute state of consciousness, we can still approach the topic of the necessity of 
absolute(s) in the mysticism in general and mystical experiences in particular. To me it 
seems that the main reason that speaks for the necessity of absolute is the voices of 
mystics themselves that describe their experiences in concepts that at the very least hint 
of absolute(s) behind them. This aspect of mysticism and absolute(s) ties it directly to the 
validity of mystical experiences, which we have already previously covered to some 
extent. However, at this point I will point out that the validity of the experiences (of 
absolute(s)) seems to be given in the experience itself.  During the experience, the mystic 
is absolutely confident of the truth and validity of his/her experience; it is part of the 
experience that there is absolutely no doubt included. In other words, during the 
experience mystic is certain that it is the Truth of reality that s/he is experiencing. This 
does speak strongly in its own special language about the existence of this mystical 
absolute.  
I believe that when we consider the Other, we should include the concept of absolute in 
it even if the concept itself remains at least partly obscured from our attempts to fully 
grasp it. Now, we can ask whether the Other that mystics encounter during the their 
mystical experience is necessarily an encounter with something that indeed is absolute, 
that is “which has nothing relative to it, and is therefore unitary or all-comprehensive in 
its nature”. Here I believe we must again look at this separately from human and divine 
points of views. From our everyday and ordinary human point of view the Other described 
in mystical experiences indeed seems to be absolute since they seem to encompass 
everything in single unitary vision. There are of course different flavors that can be found 
from various different expressions of the mystical encounters given us by mystics 
themselves, as was discussed in chapter dealing with perennialism. However, I believe 
that the Absolute is a necessary part of true mystical experience even if its detailed 
conceptualization cannot be complete. From the divine point of view, we can only say 
that the Absolute might, indeed, be fully conceptualized and be perceived as ordinary to 
a divine mind, and possibly including the mystic consciousness during the mystical 
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experience. But is it possible that what is absolute from human point of view or even 
mystical point of view is not absolute from the divine point of view. Can it be that the 
Other, which the mystic holds absolute, itself has relations to other Others? Of course we 
cannot know. And even if it goes against the core logic of our conceptual framework, I 
believe we must give room for the absolute to remain partly obscured from our prying 
minds. So in my view, the absolute is necessary from the human point of view and even 
the divine, mystical point of view, but even if the mystical experiences are valid, there 
remains a gulf separating us from the divine point of view.  
It should be noted at this point how the absolute and all-encompassing nature of the Other 
relates to monotheism since “The Fundamental idea in monotheism that God is separate 
from the world constitutes a rejection of pantheism. According to Judeo-Christian and 
Islamic conception of God, the world is entirely distinct from God.”102 Mysticism, even 
if it does have great many proponents stemming from monotheistic traditions, seems to 
point more towards pantheism. Many Christian, Judaic and Islamic mystics have, of 
course, interpreted their experiences in a way that is more favorable to their traditions, as 
was also discussed on the chapter on perennialism. What we can however say here is that 
the notions coming from Abrahamic traditions regarding God do not fit well with the 
mystical experiences without interpreting them. 
However, the Other’s separateness from the world is not that simple of a notion. From 
the human point of view that understands separateness as some things that are not 
fundamentally connected gets us only so far. From the divine point of view, the notion of 
being part of something can actually transcend our concepts to a degree that what we say 
about it is meaningless when it comes to the Truth of Reality, the nature of reality as it 
really is, regardless of our conceptual scheme. Furthermore, the notion of the Other’s 
separateness rises several interesting points regarding our attempt to understand the 
nature of the Other. For example, the separateness of the Other also means that It is 
independent of the world and its restraints, It is not subject to the laws of space and time, 
whatever they might be. 
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4.6. In Conclusion 
 
The other is extremely elusive and at least part of it is ever hidden behind ineffability. 
However, there is still something that can be said about it by us non-mystics even beyond 
the one actually obvious fact that the Other is something that can be experienced. By 
acknowledging that anything we say about the other is limited by the capabilities of 
human cognition and its conceptual framework we can distance ourselves to a safe 
distance and confidently speak about the other and its possible and necessary 
characteristics from our limited point of view. Furthermore, we can also explore the 
possible and necessary attributes that the other might have through the divine point of 
view, speculating on and imitating the mystic vision. In this chapter I only took some 
initial steps to understand the Other, but the main point I attempted to make was, that it 
is actually possible and conducive path to enter. 
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5. MYSTICISM AND SCIENCE 
 
 
When it comes to the validity of mysticism and mystical experiences I feel that it can be 
illustrative to bid scientific knowledge against knowledge gained during mystical 
experiences as they both share similar essence and goal of uncovering, and to some extent 
utilizing, the truths of reality. Particularly in the contemporary and more and more secular 
western world science is held in great regard and is generally considered to be the one 
and only valid vessel towards truth whereas spiritual, religious and mystical means and 
truths are considered to be anti-scientific by the scientific community and thus not valid 
means to uncovering and understanding truths about the reality. 
In this chapter I will examine some challenges that contemporary science can force on 
mysticism and mystical experiences. In general, I acknowledge that religion in general 
and mysticism in particular are for the most part incommensurable with science and 
bidding them against each other rarely produces anything meaningful. Naturally, some 
fundamentalist positions can, and in some cases, should be challenged by science. In 
regards to more “rational” positions coming from scholarly mysticism, any direct 
confrontation with scientific positions can easily become meaningless because of the 
incommensurability of these two positions. However, the end “goal” of mysticism does 
offer an interesting parallel with some scientific pursuits and I feel they are at least to 
some degree also commensurable.  
It should be noted that when it comes to science and scientific knowledge, I rely heavily 
on Thomas Kuhn and his theory of paradigms and to some extent his concept of scientific 
revolutions. In my opinion Kuhn’s concept of paradigm and related concept of the theory-
ladenness of observations is crucial to understanding and valuating scientific knowledge. 
I am by no means qualified to talk about Kuhn in any detail; what follows is in large parts 
based on my over a decade long observations of debates raging around various 
cosmological paradigms. 
The ideal of scientific endeavors certainly can be applauded. Science is supposed to 
represent an unbiased, objective quest for truths regarding reality.  If something is said to 
be ‘scientific’, it will already just by definition hold certain validity. Science and scientists 
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hold strong authority and influence over what and how we should think about ourselves, 
about the world around us and, most importantly to the subject of our paper, about the 
Gods and related beings or states of beings. I believe that in scientific community there 
is a general agreement that even if we do not yet have a final theory of everything, the 
theories we have now are at the very least taking our understanding towards it. Existing 
scientific knowledge is seen to be part of the final truth. Here I agree strongly with Kuhn 
whose theory of scientific revolutions denies the cumulative nature of scientific 
knowledge. 
 
5.1. Mysticism and Natural Sciences 
 
Science and religion(s) have for a long time been at odds with each other. Both are 
attempts to tell us truths about ourselves and the reality surrounding us. But their 
methodologies and approaches are very different. Religious truths are primarily based on 
doctrines, revelations and faith whereas scientific truths are primarily based on 
observations, gathered evidence and internal coherency with what is considered to be 
scientific facts together with the dominant paradigms. 
To repeat, I am well aware that this kind of simple presentation does not do justice to the 
whole spectrum of different philosophical views on both science and religion and their 
truths. When observed neutrally from the outside, the battle between religions and 
sciences has been very long and still involves plenty of stalemates in the spirit of yes-no 
argumentation. One of the main argument from science against God is that such being 
has not been detected and that such being is not necessary part of theories describing 
reality. I have no intention to take directly part in that particular debate. Instead, my goal 
here is lot more narrow, and my inquiry carefully circumscribed:  I wish to compare two 
ideas, two objects that are fundamentally as different from each other as anything can be, 
yet our attempts to know something about them share interesting similarities, as we shall 
see.  
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5.1.1. The Other vs Singularity 
 
From the side of natural sciences I have chosen to focus on gravitational singularity, 
something that cannot be measured without resorting to infinities. Yet it, and its necessary 
companion the black hole that cannot be directly observed, are generally accepted objects 
by natural sciences and at least to some degree even necessary objects that are required 
to exist for our relativistic theory of space-time to be true. Against singularity and black 
hole descends the Other. It should be noted that I do not consider the Other and mysticism 
to be waging the same battle as non-mystical religions do against science even if religions 
certainly can, and I would say perhaps even should, use mysticism to strengthen their 
position. Of course, in harnessing mysticism to fight the wars against science, religions 
should realize and accept the necessary changes to religious thoughts and truths that come 
with accepting mysticism as something that is not based on any specific religion, as I have 
argued to be the case. 
I admit, and it should be kept in mind, that I am not an expert when it comes to neither 
black holes nor the epistemology involved when putting together mathematical constructs 
and the actual reality they supposedly portray. However, I believe that no such special 
expertise is needed since for our purpose we are only required to touch the very basic 
layers of scientific methodologies and the peculiarities of black holes. 
 
5.1.1.1. How are they “observed”? 
 
The Other: Direct experience of the Other is acquired by the mystic during the mystical 
experience. Since the mystics often describe their experience using concepts such as unity 
and union, it appears that the Other is observed in its totality and the mystical experience 
itself includes veridical confirmation of the Other for the mystic him/herself. 
Black hole: Direct observation is not possible since by their very nature, black holes do 
not directly emit any signals other than the hypothetical Hawking radiation; since the 
Hawking radiation for an astrophysical black hole is predicted to be very weak, this makes 
it impossible to directly detect astrophysical black holes from the Earth. Astrophysicists 
searching for black holes thus have to rely on indirect observations. A black hole's 
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existence can sometimes be inferred by observing its gravitational interactions with its 
surroundings.103 
It seems to me that the Other makes a stronger case for validity since it is actually directly 
observed whereas black hole is not. The claim for the validity of the Other of course 
depends on the validity of mystics themselves when viewed as “observational 
instruments”. So before declaring mystics and the Other to be more valid, we need to 
consider the validity of observational instruments used. 
 
5.1.1.2. Validity of “observations”? 
 
The Other: The Other is directly observed only during the mystical experience and 
immediately after the mystical experience when the direct contact with the Other is over 
the observational instrument, i.e. the mystic, can no longer access the mystical framework 
required for the direct observation. The Other is fully revealed only during the mystical 
experience and outside the experience mystic is once again bound by the normal, non-
mystical consciousness, mystic’s every attempt to describe the observation of the Other 
is clouded by ineffability. Even if the Other, as it is observed by the mystic during the 
mystical experience, cannot be described and this ineffability certainly devalues the 
observation, it is not enough to disprove that the Other actually was encountered. 
Multiple observations are always more reliable than a single one. Throughout the history 
there have been numerous reported “observations” of the Other. Many mystics have 
recorded encountering the Other.  When we consider that we have many observations 
done in great many circumstances we can certainly make a case for the existence of the 
Other. It has been observed throughout history by various instruments (mystics) under 
various conditions (background frameworks and methodologies of mystics). There is not 
much reason to disbelieve all these hundreds of testimonies par some grand conspiracy 
that has been ongoing for ages. 
Furthermore, perennialism can and in my opinion does give validity to the notion that the 
experienced Other has been the same despite the variance in its description. In conclusion, 
I think it is valid to say that it is clear that mystics (observational instruments) do 
                                                          
103 Wikipedia on black holes: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole 
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encounter (observe) ‘something’ during the mystical experience and even if this 
‘something’ is lost in its complete, mystical form when the mystical experience is over, 
it still can act as a premise for further thought, the Other exists even if its true nature is 
clouded by ineffability and the limitations of our conceptual capabilities. Evelyn 
Underhill writes: 
 
[Mystics] should claim from us the same attention that we give to other 
explorers of countries in which we are not competent to adventure ourselves; 
for the mystics are the pioneers of the spiritual world, and we have no right 
to deny validity to their discoveries, merely because we lack the opportunity 
or the courage necessary to those who would prosecute such explorations for 
themselves.104 
 
It is not just that the Other has been observed by great many mystics, but it should also 
be acknowledged that every one of us is a potential mystic; potential instrument capable 
of experiencing the Other. Opportunity and courage might not be enough. It is entirely 
possible that only some of us actually have the potential to attain mystical experiences, 
but considering all the various backgrounds that have “produced” mystics, I strongly 
believe that the potentiality is not that uncommon. 
Black Hole: As already stated, black holes cannot be directly observed and only clues for 
their existence comes from intermediary observations of the supposed gravitational 
effects of black holes. For our purposes, I do not feel that it is necessary to go into great 
details regarding the observational instruments used in detecting various types of effects 
that are attributed to black holes. It is enough to say that modern day scientific instruments 
are capable of detecting electromagnetic spectrum from radio waves to gamma rays. It is 
clear that just as the mystics observe something, so do these telescopes, antennas and 
other instruments. Problems arise when these observations are tied into something that is 
not observed. The first layer of problem is that black hole is purely mathematical, 
theoretical construct. As far as I understand it, it is some sort of mathematical beast that 
is necessitated by the rules of the mathematical jungle also known as theory of relativity. 
Things get quite messy when we consider that black hole itself is mathematical construct 
and at its center even the math has to stretch outside mathematicians comfort zone to 
                                                          
104 Underhill 2004: 4 
64 
 
infinity. Science itself admits that the theoretical tools at its disposal do not apply at the 
level of singularity. What the science considers to be the laws of nature (as far as theory 
of relativity is concerned) simply break down there or, it might be more prudent to say 
that what science considers to be the laws of nature cannot simply be applied there.  
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain, as far 
as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. – Albert Einstein 
This famous quote by Einstein points out the problem of these purely mathematical 
constructs. There always remains a gap between reality and a mathematical model trying 
to describe it. As I already conceded, I am no expert on the fields of philosophy of science, 
philosophy of mathematics or epistemology but I still feel confident enough to agree with 
Einstein regarding the gap between reality itself and laws of mathematics. 
Besides the black hole being a mathematical construct derived from other mathematical 
constructs, there are other problems involved. The problem of theory-ladeness of 
observations is something that cannot be ignored. Even the observations of the supposed 
effects of black holes are not pure observations but instead they are dependent on various 
theories. For example, when what we consider to be cloud of interstellar gas is observed 
to signal the presence of a black hole, we are also required to use theories concerning 
interstellar gas and its behavior which in turn is another set of mathematical constructs. 
Distances are of great importance in cosmology and so we also need to apply the theories 
regarding the measurements of distances in space, which means more mathematical 
constructs. Furthermore, there are scientists who do not agree with parts of the dominant 
paradigms and even if the vast majority in in agreement, the dissenting voices should be 
noted in this evaluation.105 
In the end, our observations of supposed black hole is not just indirect, but also it relies 
on many other theories for the observation to be true. I see little in support of a claim that 
the Other and mystics observing it would inevitably have less validity than black holes. 
Black holes, for their merit, as long as the theory describing them is valid, do have much 
more substance since science is not limited by ineffability, which certainly greatly limits 
our possible understanding of the Other.  
                                                          
105As a personal tribute to daring minds, I wish to mention Halton Arp (1927-1013) and Margaret 
Burbridge (b.1919) as dissenting, yet highly respected voices. If intrinsic redshit that they have advocated 
ends up being true, there will, or at lest should, finally be a long overdue scientific revolution. 
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In conclusion, it seems that mystical knowledge of the Other is no less valid than scientific 
knowledge about black holes. It all comes down to the validity of instruments used and 
there seems to be very little rationale to dismiss mystics as reliable instruments. The Other 
that is observed remains ever hidden under the veil of ineffability and it is only the 
instruments themselves that can adequately understand the Other that was observed. 
However, as I have attempted to show in previous chapters the mere fact of mystical 
experiences as an actual phenomenon does provide a way for further understanding and 
knowledge that even non-mystics can take part in. The scientific knowledge of black 
holes is extremely theory-ladenn and the singularity itself is still acknowledged an 
anomaly, something that cannot be fully explained. In my opinion the something called 
black hole is certainly no more valid than the something called the Other. On the other 
hand, the uncertainty, or “scientific ineffability” currently surrounding the black holes 
does actually have a chance to be overcome, whereas the ineffability of mystical 
experiences can only be completely overcome by mystics during the mystical experience. 
 
5.1.2. The Tao of Physics 
 
Detecting mystical elements in the modern physics has become quite popular in some 
circles especially after physicist Frithjof Capra published The Tao of Physic: An 
Exploration of the Parallels Between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism in 1975. I 
will briefly cover parallels as presetend by Capra. 
The unity of all things. First parallel Capra examines is between the experienced unity 
and oneness of all things during the mystical experience and the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. He attempts to show that: 
 
The most important characteristic of the Eastern world view-one could almost 
say the essence of it-is the awareness of the unity and mutual interrelation of 
all things and events, the experience of all phenomena in the world as 
manifestations of a basic oneness. All things are seen as interdependent and 
inseparable parts of this cosmic whole; as different manifestations of the same 
ultimate reality.106 
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Is referring to a same unity as: 
Quantum theory thus reveals an essential interconnectedness of the universe. 
It shows that we cannot decompose the world into independently existing 
smallest units. As we penetrate into matter, we find that it is made of particles, 
but these are not the ‘basic building blocks’ in the sense of Democritus and 
Newton. They are merely idealizations which are useful from a practical point 
of view, but have no fundamental significance.107 
and: 
Quantum theory has abolished the notion of fundamentally separated objects, 
has introduced the concept of the participator to replace that of the observer, 
and may even find it necessary to include the human consciousness in its 
description of the world. It has come to see the universe as an interconnected 
web of physical and mental relations whose parts are only defined through 
their connections to the whole.108 
 
I am not qualified to talk about any details of Copenhagen or any other interpretation of 
quantum physics for that matter. But the fact that it is called ‘interpretation’ already 
reveals that quantum physics cannot at this point provide us with definite arguments for 
or against any parallels regarding unity present during mystical experience and unity 
present in quantum-level observations.  
Also as an advocate of the problem of theory-ladeness of observations, the extreme 
mathematical nature of quantum physics is in very problematic to me. According to 
Capra:  
 
The properties of the particles are then deduced from a mathematical analysis 
of their tracks; such an analysis can be quite complex and is often carried out 
with the help of computers. All these processes and activities constitute the 
act of measurement.109 
 
The “tracks” require our theories regarding the particle accelerator to be true. “The 
properties of the particles” require the ‘quite complex’ mathematical theory involved to 
be true for the result finally appearing on the computer screen to be true. 
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Capra continues to bring up examples of how physics incorporates mystical elements in 
them like the wave-particle duality that, according to him, “transcends the narrow 
framework of opposite concepts.”110 
In my opinion, it would certainly be interesting and maybe even confirmatory to mystical 
worldview if physics as presented by Capra actually were true. However, in my view the 
“mystical” elements of science can just as well, if not more likely, result from the 
problems and inconsistencies within these scientific theories rather than as a result of 
some mystical reality revealing itself in the scientific experiments. Furthermore, I believe 
that even if mystical experiences are accompanied by a physical phenomenon, it might 
be something that cannot be measured by physical means. For example, assuming that 
the particle physics are true in a sense that when studying the subatomic level of matter, 
we need to increase the amount of energy used in particle accelerators to be able to detect 
“deeper” into atomic structure. Now, if the laws governing atomic structure are such that 
uncovering the “deepest” structure within that structure would require more energy than 
the whole of reality/universe has, it would follow that the deepest and thus truest 
understanding of physical reality would remain ever outside of our inquiries.  
 
5.2. Mysticism and Cognitive Science of Religion 
 
Cognitive science of religion is a multidisciplinary approach to the study of religions. The 
focus, as the name implies, is on the human cognition and how it and its functions are 
related to the experiential facet of religions.  Multidisciplinary approach has its share of 
strengths and weaknesses. As I see it, the main strength is the wide range of different 
approaches it offers to the same topic. When researching human cognition, great many 
disciplines can have their say. It is a valid subject matter for psychology, neuroscience, 
artificial intelligence, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, evolutionary biology etc. 
Furthermore, cognition and consciousness are such ambiguous concepts that it is rather 
easy to see them play role in virtually every human endeavor. Every human activity, be 
it religious or not, is somehow related to some aspects of cognitive activity and thus can 
be studied by the conglomerate of all these cognitive sciences. This extremely wide scope 
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of not just methods, but also potential research topics is indeed a great strength, but it is 
also a potential source for several weaknesses. 
The different sciences that are part of cognitive sciences (of religion) are more or less 
developed fields of studies with their own established paradigms. By themselves they 
have clear paradigm-enforced boundaries in which they operate. For example, the set of 
valid questions that they can seek to answer and specific set of methodological tools that 
are allowed to be utilized when answering the questions are all governed by these 
paradigms. There are always questions that are not allowed, questions that do not fit inside 
their respective paradigms and basically are not considered to be part of that particular 
field. For example the methodologies that computer science (artificial intelligence) 
utilizes and the questions it seeks to answer have very little overlap with the 
methodologies and questions of sociology or evolutionary psychology. And even if there 
is some overlap in the possible questions and methodologies specified by different 
paradigms there are still several problems that need to be addressed.  
First, the conceptual framework of different fields of study might use the same 
terminology but actually refer to different things. For example concepts such as 
consciousness, intuition, emotion, experience, motivation, desire, will, representation, 
mental state, mental act are all defined differently depending on the paradigm. In other 
words, even if cognitive science of religion includes many different fields of study, they 
can be incommensurable with each other and their actual ability to work on the same 
question at the same time is greatly limited. Of course same question can be approached 
separately by each of them and reach separate answers, but then the question is if the 
results can be compared satisfactorily or do they even talk about the exact same 
phenomenon. Ideally these different approaches would complement each other, but it will 
require serious and careful considerations in order to avoid drawing wrong conclusions. 
 
5.2.1. Rational Mysticism 
 
I believe that it is entirely possible, but by no means necessary, for mystical experiences 
to occur on a causal level that cannot be observed through physical means. This might 
sound like far reaching speculation but I strongly feel that the extraordinary nature of the 
subject matter justifies extraordinary approaches and speculations. However, the 
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extraordinary nature of mystical experiences and the nature of Reality they portray do not 
rule out ordinary and detectable counterparts in the physical world. There have been 
attempts to understand and even justify mysticism and mystical experiences through 
science. Cognitive sciences have made some attempts to discover the cause of mystical 
experiences inside our brains and some advocates of mystical thought have used natural 
sciences to affirm their position. 
Significance and value of mysticism for cognitive studies and understanding of human 
consciousness comes from the fact that mystical experiences represent truly unique form 
of consciousness where the conceptual nature of normal, non-mystical consciousness is 
not present—or at least it is transformed to something different where our normal 
understanding of concepts and their nature and role cannot be applied. Study of non-
ordinary states of consciousness is certainly nothing new and for example abnormal 
psychology deals exclusively with such states of consciousness. However the focus of 
scientific approaches to what they consider to be mystical experiences seems to be 
actually concerned with religious and psychoactive experiences rather than the kind of 
mystical experiences discussed here. 
John Horgan in his book Rational Mysticism, explores several scientific studies into 
mysticism. Mysticism and mystical experiences as they have been outlined in this study 
can to some extent be found when Horgan begins his book by exploring the perennialistic 
view of Houston Smith after which he presents the contextualism of Steven Katz 
(constructivism vs perennialism).  But after that he begins his exploration into more 
“rational mysticism” and the connection to the kind of mysticism presented in this study 
is no longer relevant since mysticism and mystical experience seems to become equated 
with any type of non-standard form of experience. However, it does give us excellent 
example of what scientific ‘rational mysticism’ is. I will briefly cover the various 
scientific approaches to mysticism presented by Horgan to show if and how they could 
also relate with the kind of mysticism presented in this paper.  
The first scientific approach is what radiologist Andrew Newberg and psychiatrist Eugene 
D’Aquili have named neurotheology. Their method was to use brain scanning technology 
to search for the neural component of mystical experiences. They are perennialists in the 
sense that they believe that there is a “sense of unity deeper than the conveyed by ordinary 
consciousness” in all spiritual experiences:  
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This sensation can range from the mild communion that a congregation feels 
while singing a hymn to the “state of absolute unitary being” in which you 
lose all sense of self, of subject-object duality. This state (which Ken Wilber 
has called causal awareness and others have named the introvertive mystical 
experience) “seems to be identical in all places and times of which we have 
record,” Newberg and D’Aquili wrote, echoing the rhetoric of the perennial 
philosophy.111 
 
They scanned the brains of eight Buddhist monks during their meditation and three 
Franciscan nuns during contemplative prayer. The result was that “most of the Buddhists 
and nuns displayed increased neural activity in the prefrontal cortex and decreased 
activity in the posterior superior parietal lobe, as Newberg and D’Aquili had predicted”. 
And from this they came to a conclusion that these experiences are based “not on 
delusional ideas, but on experiences that are neurologically real“.112 
It is clear, and Newberg himself admits as much to Horgan during an interview, that the 
brain activities they recorded were not necessarily of “true” or “full” mystical 
experiences.113 I would say that a meditation experience achieved in a laboratory with 
wires attached to your head is actually very far from the kinds of mystical experience we 
are actually dealing with and interested in. It is one thing to ask the test subject to press 
button (to initiate the scan) when s/he experiences a sense of “blessedness” and totally 
other different scenario to ask one to press button when one is in a mystical state and 
“United with Reality”. I would go as far as to say that physical activity and interest to 
press buttons is extremely unlikely during “true” or “full” mystical experience. However, 
I do believe that if and when we have brain-scanning technology that can record not just 
snapshots of particular brain states but clearly record the changing brain activity leading 
to, during and after a true mystical experience, it could provide us with a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon. But I believe we are still quite far from that point. 
Firstly, we would need the technology that can do that without disturbing the mystic and, 
secondly, we would need to find a mystic and a way to verify his mystical authenticity. 
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Horgan next presents the work of Michael Persinger, whose “rational mysticism” also 
focuses on brain.  He has even created a machine that sends electromagnetic pulses to 
specific regions of brain to induce a “sense of presence” with a 40% success rate 
compared to 15% of a control group.114 There is really nothing to say about this, except 
it showcases how misunderstood mysticism and mystical experiences are. ‘Sense of 
presence’ is hardly even a non-ordinary experience and, in my opinion, has nothing to 
with the actual mystical experiences. I would be greatly surprised if one day our brain 
could be artificially activated to produce actual mystical experience but I cannot, of 
course, deny the possibility for such a miracle.  
However far from touching actual mystical experiences these two examples are, they do 
showcase that cognitive science and mysticism are not mutually exclusive. In my opinion 
mysticism provides valuable framework for scientific research from which to approach 
and seek the boundaries of human consciousness.   
 
5.2.2. Mystic Delusion 
 
Richard Dawkins, famous champion of atheism attacks the possibility for the existence 
of God in his book The God Delusion.  “You say you have experienced God directly? 
Well, some people have experienced a pink elephant, but that probably doesn't impress 
you.”115 Even if he speaks about experiencing God directly in that quote, he does not 
speak about actual mystical experiences at all.  As a sign of Dawkins’ ignorance of 
mysticism, it should also be noted that in The God Delusion the term ‘mysticism’ appears 
only once, and even that appears in the context of Dawkins quoting Einstein.116 He 
focuses on religious experiences such as seeing angels or hearing God’s voice and 
processes to give plenty of examples how our brains can easily create such experiences 
without actual object being present: 
 
I say all this just to demonstrate the formidable power of the brain's simulation 
software. It is well capable of constructing 'visions' and 'visitations' of the 
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utmost veridical power. To simulate a ghost or an angel or a Virgin Mary 
would be child's play to software of this sophistication.117 
 
Even if Dawkins does not seem to be aware of the difference between religious and 
mystical experiences, his arguments against religious experiences can also be turned 
against mystical experiences. How do we know that mystical experiences are not just 
hallucinations, some kind of products of cognitive activity where nothing actual is been 
experienced? 
I feel that it is not possible to completely deny the possibility that mystical experiences 
are like hallucinations, experiences fully formed and contained within mystics’ cognitive 
apparatus. However, in my view it is highly unlikely for several reasons. Firstly, even 
hallucinations are ordinary experiences in a sense that they include conceptual framework 
similar to that of any ordinary experience. Subject and object are still present during 
hallucinatory experiences and the experiences consist of separate and definable entities. 
If we consider all the requirements that are needed for an experience to be called mystical 
experience, it is clear that no ordinary hallucination can fulfill the requirements. Ordinary 
hallucinations differ from mystical experiences just as much as ordinary experiences do.  
I believe that the only way for this type of argument against the veridicality of mystical 
experiences as experiences of the Other to hold any potential value is to create a new 
category of hallucinatory experiences that includes all the same requirements as mystical 
experiences themselves do. However, it appears to me that the only thing that is achieved 
by labeling mystical experiences of the Other to ‘mystical hallucinations of the Other’ is 
to limit the locational “source” of the mystical experience closer to mystic’s cognitive 
apparatus. This sort of limitation, however, to me seems artificial and does not even work 
as an argument against the veridicality of mystical experiences. By definition, the Other 
is experienced in a way that transcends subject-object separation and is not bound by 
ordinary conceptual framework. This suggests that the veridicality of the experience itself 
is not limited by any argument that attempts to limit the mystical experience within the 
boundaries of mystic’s cognitive framework since it would have to assume that the 
veridicality of the Other requires it to be located somewhere outside of the mystic.  
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It might seem unjustified to use the supernatural characteristics of mystical experiences 
as a valid reason to bypass any need to describe the process by which the mystical 
experiences is attained. In my view the discovery of such process would certainly be 
valuable and thus I see no reason for the science not to keep looking for one. However, I 
believe that our current understanding regarding human cognitive faculties and our ability 
to observe and measure them is still too limited. Even if we were to discover some sort 
of ‘God field or energy’, something that permeates everything existing, and even if we 
could somehow connect that to mystical experiences, it would only give us verification 
that there actually is a physically detectable process involved. But by itself this would not 
reveal anything else. As Henry Bergson already put it over a century ago: 
 
[…] we do not prove and we never shall prove by any reasoning that the 
psychic fact is fatally determined by the molecular movement. For in a 
movement we may find the reason of another movement, but not the reason 
of a conscious state: only observation can prove that the latter accompanies 
the former.118 
 
To truly and completely understand mystical experiences we would need to discover a 
new language, a new way of communication capable of non-conceptual descriptions. This 
is, of course, virtually impossible. Consequently, attempts to understand mysticism 
should focus on refining and sharpening our concepts to gain ever better understanding 
of the Other—not just in theory but also in practice.  
However, even if “normal” hallucinations are not capable of producing actual mystical 
experiences, there is nothing that can stop someone from claiming of having had mystical 
experience without ever having had anything of the like. Because of the ineffable nature 
of mystical experiences, anyone with even little knowledge about mysticism can describe 
authentic sounding mystical experience. Deception is no stranger to any discipline, 
scientific or otherwise. Yet mysticism is not in a very good position in this regard since 
there is not much that can be done to verify the truthfulness of mystical claims since the 
described experience cannot be reproduced by any ordinary means. Verification 
capabilities in this sense are directly proportional to our lie detection capabilities. 
                                                          
118 Bergson 1950: 148 
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I feel that examining context does often provide a rather reliable way to detect falsehood. 
Good example would be a note sewn inside the coat of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) that 
was found after his death: 
              
The year of grace 1654 / Monday, November 23, day of Saint Clement, pope 
and martyr, / and others in the martyrology. / Vigil of Saint Chrysogonus, 
martyr, and others. / From about ten-thirty in the evening to about half an hour 
after midnight. 
Fire. / God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers 
and savants. / Certitude, certitude; feeling, joy, peace. / God of Jesus Christ. 
Deum meum et Deum vestrum. / "Thy God shall be my God." / Forgetting 
the world and everything, except God. / He is only found by the paths taught 
in the Gospel. / Grandeur of the human soul. / "Just Father, the world has not 
known you, but I have known you." / Joy, joy, joy, tears of joy. / I separated 
myself from him: Dereliquerunt me lantern aquae vivae. / "My God, will you 
abandon me?" / May I not be eternally separated from him. / "This is eternal 
life, that they know you, the only true God, and him whom you have sent, 
Jesus Christ." / Jesus Christ. / Jesus Christ. / I separated myself from him; I 
fled him, renounced him, crucified him. / May I never be separated from him! 
/ He is only kept by the paths taught in the Gospel. / Total and sweet 
renunciation. / Total submission to Jesus Christ and to my director. / Eternally 
in joy for a day of trial on earth. / Non obliviscar sermones tuos. Amen.119 
 
If anything, I feel that it can be safely assumed that Pascal did not sew the note describing 
his experience with an intent to deceive. I feel confident to say that he actually did 
experience something described in the note. Whether or not it was an actual mystical 
experience is another question, but at the very least any intentional deceit can be ruled 
out.  
 
5.3. In Conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that natural sciences are generally considered to be the antithesis of 
religion. Creator God is denounced by mathematical Big Bang that supposedly justifies 
birth and the nature of the universe in all its temporal and spatial glory. However, science 
does not really know why Big Bang Banged and is in its current form basically a case of 
                                                          
119 Text with additional commentary can be found on Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion & 
Science: http://inters.org/faith-reason-pascal-memorial 
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creatio ex nihilo and as such Creator can be attributed.  Of course, science cannot accept 
that something is created out of nothing so the scientists armed with complex 
mathematical models have conjured up all kinds of dimensions, multiverses and strange 
matter fluctuations to describe what, if anything, existed before space and time. I have 
heard this trend to be labeled as mathemagics, a fitting name in my agreeably uneducated 
opinion. In more down to earth manner, also evolutionary biology challenges religious 
notions regarding creation of humans and other biological beings. God and other forms 
of divinity are easily bypassed in scientific thought because most importantly such things 
or beings are not required by current scientific theories and also there is no empirical 
evidence that prove the existence of such things or beings. 
In the end I do not see natural sciences to have anything to give to mysticism; their 
challenges can only be directed to some specific mystical doctrines that some mystics 
might explicate in their works, most often in relation to their traditional background and 
as I see it, having little connection to the their actual mystical side. Mysticism, as long as 
it is “true”, might have a lot to offer to natural sciences. It all depends whether the Unity 
observed during mystical experiences could also be detected by some physical 
instrument. Quantum mechanics seem to already be making claims in that direction, but 
in my opinion such claims are premature but it will certainly be interesting to see if and 
how such claims and discoveries mature over time through technological and theoretical 
advancements. I cannot deny that the strangeness and charm of quantum mechanics could 
not be related with the strangeness and charm of mysticism. 
Mystics are human beings and can be studies as such. They may be peculiar characters 
especially after their mystical Realization and this peculiarity could make relatively easy 
to capture research topic. To borrow concepts from Underhill; cognitive science of 
religion could most certainly study Mystic Life all the way from its early stages to its 
culmination as Unitive Life. Underhill writes in her ever eloquent way:  
 
It is the peculiarity of the Unitive Life that it is often lived, in its highest and 
most perfect forms, in the world; and exhibits its works before the eyes of 
men […] The spirit of man having at least come to full consciousness of 
reality, completes the circle of Being; and returns to fertilize those levels of 
reality from which it sprang.120  
                                                          
120 Underhill 2004: 414 
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In the end I don’t believe that there is any way to (scientifically) verify that actual 
Absolute was experienced, the absolute verification remains sole domain of mystics 
themselves. However, the afterglow of their illumination might very well be detectable.121 
I do not know what kind of psycho-biographical method cognitive science of religion 
could utilize in studying the historical mystics, but I cannot think of any reason why it 
could not or should not be done. I would also be quite wary of labeling the contemporary 
“mystics” as representatives of the highest tier mysticism, but they could certainly form 
another set of research subjects. Studying these contemporary living mystics, their lives 
and detailed context within which their experiences took/take place could certainly 
provide valuable scientific understanding for scholarly mysticism. More so if I am wrong 
in my reluctance to accept them as representatives of true mystics, a possibility that I 
readily acknowledge. But as long as my understanding of experiences themselves is valid, 
no matter how in depth case study was conducted, the experience itself and its mechanism 
would stay hidden. Several case studies might establish some boundaries in which they 
take place, but I am confident that no detailed category for contexts/methods/etc. is 
possible except for maybe some general motivation driving these mystics, which would 
actually be extremely interesting discovery. 
Cognitive science (of religion) also has relatively young fields. For example psychology 
and neuroscience are just by themselves still seeking their identity and evolving rapidly. 
This fact can be seen as a great relief and many new, even revolutionary advanced might 
be on the horizon. However, this also means that whenever cognitive scientists begins 
with “based on latest research..” one should remember that the “latest research” of today 
might very well be considered archaic in few years, especially in the case of 
neurosciences. 
The core of mysticism in the way I approach it works outside naturalistic explanations. 
But there are certainly some layers outside the core itself I would not mind cognitive 
science of religion to inspect. However, in my view the core itself cannot be altered by 
such approaches but as long as the paradigm of (true) mysticism is integrated in the 
research it could perhaps bring some light to the ever elusive mystical core and as a final 
concession; maybe even point way towards pathways for deeper understanding. 
                                                          
121 Underhill herself disagrees with the notion that Unitive Life could be measured  
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6. VALUE OF MYSTICISM 
 
 
The value of mysticism, I argue, is certainly not limited to the mystics themselves, but 
the acknowledgment of the existence of mystical phenomenon allows us to pursue the 
matter further and as I strongly believe, gain valuable, if not insights of certainty, then at 
the very least new points of views to examine nothing less than the nature of our own 
existence and the nature of reality within which we exist. In this chapter I will explore the 
potential of mysticism; what is it that mysticism and scholarly mysticism can offer not 
just as a phenomenon but also as a practice. What does the mysticism offer, what is its 
value? 
 
6.1. Perennialism 
 
In the chapter on perennialism, I believe it was shown that even if the truth of 
perennialism is not without question, it is well-grounded enough to easily justify and, I 
would claim, even demand further exploration to see the sort of conclusions that can be 
reached when the truth of perennialism is taken as a premise. This leads me to formulate 
the following premise: There exists a mystical state of being, which holds a universal 
truth that can be attained through different methodologies stemming from different 
traditions.  
From this, several valuable conclusions regarding our understanding of religious 
traditions will follow. Firstly, it becomes clear that there is no single religious tradition, 
theology, or belief system that holds hegemony of any kind of mystical truth over others. 
Abrahamic religions, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism and in fact most, if not all, religious 
traditions have something I have decided to call ‘mystical potential’. The Truth and the 
Other is at least potentially available to any tradition that acknowledges the existence of 
the Other, God, Absolute, the Ultimate reality, something above and/or beyond our 
normal state of being and existence. I believe that the wide cultural, social and religious 
(including non-religious) variety of mystics throughout the ages clearly shows that the 
intention and motivation to discover the Other is if not the only, but certainly extremely 
important, methodological aspect that matters. From this conclusion we can say that when 
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it comes to the aspects revealed in, and stemming from, mystical experience, every 
religion, tradition and belief system is just as correct as any other. Our understanding of 
the nature of the Other determines the significance of this conclusion. If the Other indeed 
is fundamental state of Reality and source of Meaning, then the significance and value of 
the perennialistic mysticism is beyond measure.  
On practical level, differences between religions and belief systems could be reduced to 
a matter of personal taste. Or perhaps in a more proper tone, all of them could be elevated 
to be similarly correct pathways to a higher truth. I recognize the near impossibility of 
integrating such an idea to existing religious dogmas and doctrines, but it could certainly 
act as an effective catalyst to religious pluralism. I wish to add, even if this is mostly in 
the spirit of day dreaming, that if the truth perennialism was accepted by religious 
practitioners, wouldn’t it mean that all the terrible acts done in the name of religions 
would cease to happen. How is that for a value, even if only day dreamy kind? Secondly, 
we can conclude that since the ‘mystical potential’ has no necessary connection to the 
specific theoretical and theological background of the belief systems, it follows that the 
nature of the Other cannot be tied directly to any such backgrounds, but each belief system 
can still partake in pursuing the Other. From the point of view of mysticism, religiosity 
and religions hold great value, but fundamental positions within them are regarded ill-
founded even if they still allow the pursuit of mystical experiences. 
 
6.2. Ethics and Morality  
 
Also this mystic wisdom gained during mystical experience is not just knowledge about 
how things really are. It necessarily comes with a practical aspect. With mystic wisdom 
comes understanding of meaning, which guides the way we live. It would be tempting to 
say that a mystic after his/her mystical experience would from the human point of view 
become if not morally perfect then at least very nearly so. Smith’s position is along these 
lines: “[M]ature mystical knowledge must manifest itself throughout one’s life. “If you 
think you are advancing toward unity with God or the absolute,” he said, “and are not 
growing in love and charity toward your fellow person, you’re just deluding yourself.” 
Smith would be “profoundly suspicious” of anyone who claimed to be enlightened but 
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did not exhibit these basic human virtues.”122 However, in regards to the question of 
morality, Jones points out that there are two basic positions that oppose each other. Other 
position is similar to that of Smith’s according to which: 
 
[…] only mystics are truly compassionate and moral. Only mystical 
experiences permit us to escape our normal self-centeredness, thereby freeing 
and outflow of love: the lack of personal attachments enables the mystic to be 
deeply concerned with all people. Further, only with the proper selfless 
motivation can we truly help another person; otherwise, we would only be 
imposing our own selfish desires upon others.123 
 
It is tempting to accept this view and not just because the concept of “normal self-
centeredness” rings true whenever and wherever one observes humans and humanity in 
action but also, I admit, because I have a personal desire to label mysticism as morally 
good in all its forms and glory. Unfortunately (for me and my desires), Jones presents the 
other position, which seems to ring true with equal clarity: 
 
[...] the inward orientation of mystical practices leads to a total disregard of 
all worldly affairs. No action affects the unchanging ultimate realities, and so 
no act is important. A conflict this develops between the realms of morality 
and of spiritual freedom – morality as much as immorality is seen as the 
product of ignorance. Like the enlightened prisoner returning to Plato’s cave, 
enlightened mystics do not deem the values of our shadow world to be of 
ultimate significance.124 
   
These two alternatives also bring out an interesting contrast with my distinction between 
divine and human points of view. First position seems to be close to the divine point of 
view as far as mystical experience itself relates to it. Second position seems to describe 
the human point of view, a possible methodological guide to reach the Other. Just as I 
believe it is necessary to keep these two points of view separate, I also believe that these 
two positions are conceptually incompatible and need to be kept separated.  
                                                          
122 Horgan 2003: 22 (Interview with Houston Smith) 
123 Jones 1993: 187 
124 Jones 1993: 187 
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I believe that the Other is not necessarily morally good in a sense our ordinary human 
concepts can define and understand morality. This entails that I am forced to believe and 
admit that mystic during the mystical experience itself is not necessarily morally good 
assuming the mystic is even capable of any action that could be evaluated morally during 
the experience. However the ultimate goal of the mystic is not to just achieve mystical 
experience but to achieve enlightenment: 
 
The goal of the mystical quest is not to attain isolated mystical experiences 
which may have no lasting effect upon the person but enlightenment 
(knowledge of the fundamental truths of the nature of reality and a life in 
accordance with them). This involves an inner transformation of the whole 
person, not merely a change of belief or experiences (although either of these 
may touch off the transformation). In enlightenment, a framework of belief-
claims is internalized: one no longer merely accepts intellectually the idea 
that, say, all is impermanent: one sees that it is true of everything. This may 
involve no change in the belief-claims themselves nor any change in behavior 
if one had been adjusting one’s life in accordance with this knowledge.  But 
dispositions are transformed: one is no longer motivated even subtly by greed 
or by anything dependent upon misguided belief or the incomplete application 
of the belief framework.125 
 
 
I disagree with Jones on the point that isolated mystical experience might not have a 
lasting effect. Even the “mildest” versions of mystical experience we have been 
discussing certainly are experiences that cannot be had without leaving long, if not 
everlasting traces.126 When one has had an experience of unity with the nature, with 
reality itself, I find it next to impossible that its effect on the mystic would just fade away 
like dreams. Enlightenment is something we have not been discussing since it is not the 
focus of this study but if the state of enlightenment is possible and achievable through 
mystical experience(s), then their value would reach levels that would need divine point 
of view to be completely understood and appreciated. Evelyn Underhill does not speak 
about enlightenment but of Unitive Life: 
                                                          
125 Jones 1993: 190 
126 For example, the subjects of the famous “Good Friday Experiment” reported continuing positive effects 
of their experience even after 27 years. I will not make assumptions nor claims regarding the authenticity 
of their experiences as mystical in a sense that I have discussed in this study. However, at the very least 
the experiences do have some parallels. See Doblin 1991: 23 
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The Unitive Life, though so often lived in the world, is never of it. It belongs 
to another plane of being, moves securely upon levels unrelated to our speech; 
and hence eludes the measuring power of humanity. We, from the valley, can 
only catch a glimpse of the true life of these elect spirits, transfigured upon 
the mountain. They are far away, breathing another air: we cannot reach them. 
Yet it is impossible to over-estimate their importance for the race. They are 
ambassadors to the Absolute. They vindicate humanity’s claim to the possible 
and permanent attainment of Reality; bear witness to the practical qualities of 
transcendental life. 127 
 
If isolated mystical experiences do have a lasting effect, which I believe to be the case, 
they present us with a type of value that can be explored without divine point of view, 
without requiring mystical experiences and mystical knowledge gained from them. In my 
view, it cannot be denied that mystical experiences give the mystic unique viewpoint not 
just of the outside reality but also of their own position in relation to it. Mystical 
experiences in their most simple aspect show the mystic that the ordinary state of being 
and ordinary form of experiencing the world is not the whole truth. There is something 
greater out there that eludes our normal attempts to reach it. Even without divine point of 
view on ‘unity’, I believe it is valid to assume that from human point of view ‘unity’ is 
something that is capable of shattering the self-centeredness and much more. 
Mystical worldview, or simply believing in mysticism can have positive affects to even 
non-mystics. What would the implications be to ethics and morality, to the ways we see 
other living beings and the world we inhabit? What if the Christian mystic’s way of living 
the life of Christ and its essence of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” 
was part of the true path revealed by mystics just like the Buddha’s guiding words 
“consider others as yourself”? The main thing here is that the mystics seem to have come 
up from their mystical quests with answers of this kind. Could belief in mysticism solve 
the many differences and conflicts that currently plague humanity? I do understand how 
far reaching this is, but if mysticism presents us with the true view of the reality and our 
place (even if mystically vague) in it and it was accepted, it would most certainly solve 
many problems plaguing humanity.  
                                                          
127 Underhill 2004: 414. Emphasis mine. 
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This understanding by itself could lead to a more fulfilling and meaningful understanding 
of one’s life. It could also alleviate, even remove, the fears regarding life’s eventual 
ending.  In addition, it could assuage one’s confusions of what to do with one’s life to 
make it count and deliberate individuals from agonizing over whether they are worthy of 
the gift of life—or however one decides to view the ‘existence’ we have received.  
In sum, I see mysticism having great potential as a unifying force that could become a 
religious and/or spiritual tradition by itself. Its tenets are simple, the mystic way of life 
promotes as morale and good way of life as any religion and the mystic “facts” of Unity 
and Union between the Other and ourselves gives meaning to existence, even if the 
understanding of it remains only available during mystical experience. 
 
6.3. Mystic Wisdom 
 
There is no doubt that mystical experience has enormous noetic value to the mystic who 
is able to attain it. A whole new and fundamental type of Reality becomes directly 
accessible to him/her. As we have seen in the earlier chapters regarding the definitions 
and types of mystical experiences and the nature of the Other, nature of mystical 
knowledge gained from the experience is not ordinary kind of knowledge but something 
very different. Mystic might not come out of the experience holding a new and definite 
set of facts regarding the mystical nature of Reality but instead with a sense and absolutely 
clarity that ‘something was directly encountered’ (i.e. a set of facts that the Other was 
encountered, even if the experience is now clouded by ineffability). Just like ordinary 
experiences shape and form us, it is in my opinion evident that experiences at the level of 
mystical experiences must have a lasting impact even beyond what was discussed earlier.  
Even if the mystic is not able to use ordinary concepts to describe the understanding s/he 
now has or even categorize it as new understanding, it does not remove the possibility 
that s/he does have it. It can manifests itself, for example, as a sort of feeling that there 
exists a ‘meaning’ for our human existence and that there is a deep connection or even 
unity between everyone and everything. I would like to call this kind of mystical 
“information” available to mystic ‘mystic wisdom’, since I feel that the term wisdom has 
a close connection to understanding how things operate without the need to delve into the 
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details of specific operating parts, which again, to me, belong more to a providence of 
intelligence. 
I feel that this “sort of feeling” must not be underestimated nor undervalued. It is one 
thing to believe in unity of all things and another thing to having experienced the unity of 
all things and knowing it is a Real state of the Reality, the Other. 
 
6.4. Epistemology 
 
One of the main characteristics of mystical experience and knowledge gained from it is 
its ineffability, as repeatedly stated by scholars and mystics alike. Mystical experience 
and knowledge is something that goes beyond normal reason. No amount of symbols in 
any form can adequately describe the experience, thus completely obscuring its full 
significance to those who have not attained such mystical states themselves. This negative 
characterization is easily seen as being something to be used against the value and validity 
of mystical experiences. 
However, even if the true nature of the mystical experience remains inaccessible to non-
mystics, we are still offered an extremely valuable domain of knowledge when we 
acknowledge mystical experiences as an actual and true phenomenon. It is entirely 
possible to form new and constructive premises from the fact that at least some humans 
have some faculty or condition in them that allows the mystical experiences to occur. 
True, there is a leap of faith involved when stating that there is an actual contact with the 
fundamental level of reality and the mystic during these mystical states of mind. But when 
considering all the arguments for the validity of these experiences that I have given in this 
paper, I believe this leap is very well justified and it is essential to understanding and fully 
exploring the potential value of mysticism. 
If mystical experiences give us knowledge about fundamental nature of Reality (the 
Other) that is not obtainable by any non-mystical means, this leads me to formulate a new 
epistemological hierarchy of knowledge regarding reality and our place in it: 
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1. Divine point of view (mystical wisdom). Mystical knowledge available during mystical 
experience in which we are in direct contact with the Fundamental Reality. 
2. True knowledge about the physical operations of the physical world and ourselves 
combined with knowledge and acknowledgement of the existence of the Other which is 
only directly observed during mystical experience and true knowledge what the existence 
of such Reality entails. 
3. Knowledge and acknowledgement of the existence of the Other which is only directly 
observed during mystical experience and true knowledge what the existence of such 
Reality entails. 
4. True knowledge about the physical operations of the physical world. 
 
By ’true knowledge about the physical operations of the physical world’, I am referring 
to ideal scientific knowledge. At the same time, I acknowledge that it might well be (and 
likely is) impossible to actually attain absolute certainty when it comes to scientific truths. 
And by ’true knowledge of what the existence of such Reality entails’, I am referring to 
ideal philosophical knowledge, that is, a complete set of all true conclusions that can be 
derived from the truth of correctly understood nature of mystical experiences. I do not 
dare to even guess how complete a true knowledge about physical world can be. But it 
can certainly be said that it does not need to be complete understanding of everything 
physical, just that it has to be as complete as is physically possible. It may very well be 
that the nature of the physical reality itself limits the possible scope of how it can be 
measured and understood.128 
Both scientific and philosophical ideals can certainly be approached and—even if I am 
admittedly biased in the matter—I believe that philosophical path is easier to travel further 
towards the ideal than the scientific one. The problem of ineffability certainly makes the 
philosophical path very problematic and filled with intersections, which certainly tell us 
about the impossibility of ever actually reaching the final destination. Regardless, I 
strongly believe that even if the ideal state itself can only be attained through less travelled 
                                                          
128 See chapter 5.1.2. ”The Tao of Physics” 
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paths of the mystics, the paths left for non-mystics are still valuable and will lead to better 
understanding of not just mysticism, but also reality itself and even the Other. 
Even if the noetic aspects of the mystical experiences are not fully veridical in nature, 
they certainly retain at least some (and I would say meaningful) value. The mere fact that 
the phenomenon of mystical experiences exist even without assuming anything about the 
noetic quality of the experiences, it is certainly meaningful that throughout the history of 
man and seemingly with no or very little regard to specific backgrounds of mystics these 
kind of experiences have and continue to exist. Not only does it give us a reasonable 
justification to assume their veridicality and pursue the meaning following such 
assumptions, but it also tells us something undoubtedly interesting about the nature of our 
consciousness that philosophers and anyone dealing with human cognition can study and 
potentially learn something new and meaningful about its nature. 
 
6.5. In Conclusion 
 
The mere possibility that the humankind may find answer to the ‘eternal why’, the mere 
hint of a possibility to discover the true meaning behind and beyond all the fleeting 
appearances that fill the normal experiences of everyday world. Can there be anything 
more important? Can there be anything more valuable than touching the Truth if it really 
is possible? To me, the answer is as clear as pure light. Nothing can be more important 
than finding the meaning of existence. 
But, of course, it is not that simple. The mystical knowledge and any meaning that it 
might reveal is fully available only to mystics themselves during their mystical 
experiences. However, regardless of the great many difficulties that the ineffability of 
mystical experiences causes, it does not diminish the fact that mysticism appears to be 
the only vessel capable of actually validating the notion that there might actually be a 
meaning for existence capable of surpassing the limitations or ordinary conceptual 
framework.  
What we can observe is the effect of gaining mystical insights to the mystics themselves. 
If the experience changes the mystic we can see the effects of the Other even if the Other 
itself remains the private property of those who have experienced it. Also, if we are able 
to establish the validity of mystical experiences, then it raises interesting questions for 
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non-mystics and maybe even the mystics themselves to pursue. Why is The Other hidden 
from normal use of senses and why gaining access to it requires a special set of conditions 
which themselves seem to vary greatly from mystic to mystic and tradition to tradition? 
What is the role of our physical existence and the human functions that such existence 
entails in relation to the possibility of transcending the limitations of human existence? 
Mysticism, at least in potential has something of value to offer towards virtually any 
human endeavor, be it understanding of the world or ourselves. The truth of mysticism 
does not just give rise to a new epistemological hierarchy, but it also points towards new 
paths for scholars of mysticism and to anyone else willing to embrace of truth mysticism 
and mystical experiences as a premise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Mysticism and the eternal questions it deals with have intrigued humans since ancient 
times; throughout the history there have been men and women who have not been 
satisfied with the mere appearances of the phenomenal world. These mystics, these 
“lovers of reality”,129 have sought and discovered the Other. Sometimes the mystics have 
been revered whereas other times they have been hunted down as heretics. Mysticism is 
part of almost every religion but at the same time it goes above and beyond all of them. 
Even if mysticism—its Truths and its goals—are eternal, times change and so does the 
conceptions of reality and it has become increasingly difficult and less tempting to love 
reality. The main purpose of this thesis has been to show that mysticism still offers a valid 
reason and a way to connect with, and love, reality. Now that we have reached the 
conclusion, I will also let my personal feelings towards mysticism show more as I attempt 
to bring my brief foray into mysticism to its end. 
 
7.1. Validity of Mysticism 
 
Mystical experience that lies at the epicenter of mysticism is a very difficult concept to 
grasp intellectually. Not only is there a great variety of ways to define what is meant by 
mystical experiences in the first place, but also any attempt to understand the phenomenon 
of mysticism has to overcome conceptual challenges presented by their inherent 
ineffability.  To understand mysticism, one has to accept that the most significant part of 
it will always remain hidden behind a barrier that only the mystics themselves are capable 
of breaking through. 
Despite these challenges, I have tried to show that perennialism—the presence of 
mysticism and convincingly similar mystical experiences throughout the ages and 
cultures—clearly points towards a universal core behind the mystical experiences. The 
existence of such a core not only gives validity to the whole phenomenon of mystical 
                                                          
129 An example of Evelyn Underhill’s artful use of words. It is also thanks to her and the beauty of her 
expressions that I discovered mysticism. 
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experiences but it also provides a way for non-mystics to approach the Other, the ineffable 
object of mystical experiences. Even if all it allows us to see is a shadow play of mystical 
utterances, I believe it is enough to be able talk about that which can never be understood, 
that which transcends everything ordinary human conceptual schemes can reach out to. 
Constructivism that stands in direct opposition to perennialism refuses to acknowledge 
the perennialist position regarding the unique and universal nature of mystical 
experiences. Constructivists refuse to accept that any experience is possible outside the 
epistemological assumption that presumes that there is only one general, if multifaceted, 
type of experience that is governed by whatever laws actually do govern the realm of 
human consciousness. Human mind is still a great mystery and anyone who claims 
otherwise shows more faith than reason towards cognitive sciences. Constructivists argue 
that perennialists are wrong “because of the kind of beings we are.” I would claim that it 
is arrogant to consider that we actually fully know what kind of beings we are. Cognitive 
science cannot yet explain ordinary consciousness and the few inquiries into mystical 
consciousness that science has undertaken have generally been conducted under 
misconstrued premises of what mystical experiences are. Constructivist arguments are 
not capable of explaining the richness of mystical experiences that often come in forms 
that go above and beyond the rules laid out by constructivists; they do not possess the 
necessary blueprints to construe mystical experiences. 
I strongly believe that perennialism, or at least its essence, its central tenet of universal 
core behind mystical experiences, is correct. But considering the scope of the topic, I 
would say that even a mere possibility for perennialism to be valid position should have 
everyone, including constructivists, advocating, encouraging or conducting further 
inquiries into perennialistic mysticism and explore the possibilities and ramifications that 
its basic premises entail. It seems to me that mysticism is just not very well suited to 
contemporary worldviews. Mere mention of the Truth, God, Absolute and other similar 
concepts well suited for mysticism are met with resistance out of principles rooted in the 
prevailing worldview mostly inspired by science. 
Partly for this reason, and partly to strengthen the validity of mysticism, I challenged 
mysticism through science. Great unknowns are no strangers to modern science and their 
methods to validate them are no better, and in some cases probably even worse than those 
of mysticism. Complex mathematics describing objects that only few people can 
“understand”, only super computers can calculate, and that can never be directly observed 
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are applauded as great knowledge. At the same time, only few are even aware of millennia 
worth of experiences by men and women who have sought and discovered the Other. In 
other words, it is not the Spirit itself, but the spirit of the age that manages to keep 
mysticism at the fringes of public awareness and academia itself. It was by mere chance 
I discovered the beauty of mysticism myself—and am forever grateful that I did. 
 
7.2. Value of Mysticism 
 
A Mere assumption (and I believe that I have by shown that such an assumption is well 
justified) regarding the validity of mystical experiences as an actually occurring 
phenomenon opens up a whole plethora of possible avenues to pursue regarding 
mysticism and its wider meaning. Mysticism can, or maybe even should, become a 
significant part for the study of the nature of human consciousness and the nature of our 
(human) existence in general. It provides us with a new framework through which to 
examine the nature of reality itself. However, when using mystical experiences as a 
premise for a framework from which to proceed, it comes with same limitations that come 
with the ineffability of mystical experiences. It is therefore necessary to acknowledge the 
limitations of the human point of view in comparison to the divine point of view. 
Mysticism also offers a unique and beautiful worldview that can affect even non-mystics. 
Even if the mystical truths remain hidden from non-mystics, it is possible to form outlines 
of the Other; of the Reality that is not just the Truth, but also a worthy source for us to 
find comfort and ultimately even meaning in. The unity or union that forms one of the 
essential characteristics of mystical experiences speak of a mode of existence that we 
each share in which we, everything and everyone, are much more than it appears. To 
regard mysticism as a worldview, or maybe as a view of reality, does bring it rather close 
to religiosity. The main difference is the vast inclusiveness of mysticism as it culminates 
in the motivations of mystics rather than any in set of doctrines. Understandably, this 
aspect of the value of mysticism is not easy to accept. However, one does not need to go 
as far or as deep; mysticism can easily accommodate and inspire less dedicated but also 
valuable approaches. 
Mystical experiences as a unique conscious phenomeon should certainly open up new or 
at least very seldom traversed pathways not just to philosophy (for example philosophy 
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of mind, religion, mysticism and even epistemology), but also to cognitive sciences. The 
few examples of such approaches I presented in this study were inherently flawed in their 
undervaluation and even misunderstanding of mystical experiences. I do not know if the 
faculty of our consciousness or of our being that allows mystical experiences to occur can 
even be revealed, but there is no reason not to try. The value of such a discovery would 
most certainly be immense. Furthermore, as long as the validity of a specific mystic can 
be verified, behavioral sciences should be in a very good position to detect mystical 
afterglow of mystical experiences. Authentic mystics could most certainly become very 
interesting and revealing subjects for study.   
With natural sciences application of mysticism is not so straightforward. I outlined some 
concerns that I have with increasingly theoretical approaches. It seems to me that science 
is distancing itself from reality—the very same reality whose secrets it is supposed to 
uncover. Mysticism on the other hand points directly at the reality in its own ineffable 
way. However, mysticism and the incomplete picture of reality it portrays under the veil 
of ineffability could still guide even natural sciences to new paths of discovery. The Other 
does possess qualities that might manifest in some way or form in the physical world.  
 
7.3. Potential of Mysticism  
 
The over hundred-year old debate between perennialism and constructivism has run its 
course. I do not believe that any additional debating can have a significant enough impact 
to turn the constructivists away from their epistemological assumptions. And I can say 
for certain that no amount of arguments can make me a constructivist. I wholeheartedly 
support various approaches in regards to ordinary experiences, but I do not see mystical 
experiences ever conforming to the rules governing ordinary experiences. Furthermore, 
the various attempts that have been made to reconcile the two positions are doomed to 
fail as there cannot be any common ground between mediated and unmediated mystical 
experiences. 
Perennialism in its traditional form as a mere antithesis for constructivism has similarly 
run its course and it is time for it to evolve beyond its basic premises. I argued for the 
significance of “the Other is”, that in my opinion is the most important premise derived 
from perennalism and took some preliminary steps to see what such premise means and 
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where it can lead. There must be great many paths one could take to advance mysticism 
from the perennialistic position along with other approaches that acknowledge the 
validity and uniqueness of mystical experiences. In essence, mysticism forms a mystery 
of two realities—one real and the other Real—and a way to approach this mystery within, 
or more importantly, outside any traditional doctrines.  
Mysticism is and should be valued as an eternal tradition. It is a story about the means to 
an eternal end. For mystics themselves it is a pathway to the Other. For the scholars of 
mysticism it is a framework that validates not just the eternal questions, but it also opens 
up interesting ways to approach and understand the ordinary world of being in the light 
of mystical experiences and the Other they reveal. 
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